Mitchell v. Ramsey, 381 S.W.3d 74

This is an Arkansas wrongful-death and survival action arising from Tyson Massengill’s death when a CASE field sprayer’s arm deployed and struck his truck.
Plaintiffs Mitchell and Marking, acting as administrators of Massengill’s estate, sued Ramsey, UAP, Case Corporation, and Gemini Enterprises; Case and Gemini settled before trial, but the third-party complaint against Case remained.
The trial court granted summary judgment on multiple negligence and registration/permit issues, finding no proximate cause and that registration/permits were not required at the time of the accident.
The appellate court previously dismissed the appeal for lack of finality after affirming the grant of summary judgment on negligence questions.
On remand, defendants sought summary judgment on registration/permit issues based on an affidavit purporting § 27‑35‑102 had been superseded by later law; plaintiffs opposed.
The court ultimately reversed and remanded, holding questions of inconsistency, proximate cause, and other negligence claims required trial or further consideration.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the doctrine of inconsistent positions/judicial estoppel apply to plaintiffs’ alternative pleadings?	Mitchell relies on alternative theories; no deliberate inconsistency.	Ramsey/UAP contend inconsistent positions exist due to design-defect vs. negligence theories.	Appellants not barred; no judicial estoppel; reverse on this point.
Was appellees’ violation of the law a proximate cause, requiring jury determination?	Violation of overwidth/permit statutes contributed to accident; statute designed for public safety.	Proximate cause cannot be established as a matter of law; no direct causal link.	Proximate cause is a question of fact for the jury; reverse on this point.
Did the circuit court err by granting summary judgment on remaining negligence claims not moved for?	Claims against Ramsey (control, speed, lookout) could be pursued alongside field-sprayer defect.	No issue remains to support; claims not moved for summary judgment.	Reversed on this point; remaining negligence claims revived for trial.

Parsons Dispatch, Inc. v. John J. Jerue Truck Broker, Inc., 89 Ark. App. 25, 199 S.W.3d 686 (2004) (Ark. App. 2004) (party-bound by pleadings; cannot assume inconsistent positions)
George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999) (Ark. 1999) (allowance of alternative theories of liability)
Odom v. Odom, 232 Ark. 229, 335 S.W.2d 301 (1960) (Ark. 1960) (availability of alternative theories; binding pleadings)
McMickle v. Griffin, 369 Ark. 318, 254 S.W.3d 729 (2007) (Ark. 2007) (instruction that statutory violations can be evidence of negligence; repeal by implication of §27-35-102 vs §27-35-210)
Dupwe v. Wallace, 355 Ark. 521, 140 S.W.3d 464 (2004) (Ark. 2004) (judicial estoppel elements; caution against strict application)
Craig v. Traylor, 323 Ark. 363, 915 S.W.2d 257 (1996) (Ark. 1996) (proximate cause is question of law only when reasonable minds cannot differ)