Mitchell v. Eli Lilly & Co.
159 F. Supp. 3d 967
E.D. Mo.2016Background
- Plaintiffs (mother Sophia Mitchell and child C.D.) allege birth defects from medications (bupropion, fluoxetine, valproic acid) prescribed and taken in Tallahassee, Florida; child born in Gainesville, FL. Plaintiffs reside in Northern District of Florida.
- Action filed in Missouri state court (Feb 2015); GlaxoSmithKline LLC removed to federal court based on diversity.
- Plaintiffs sue GlaxoSmithKline, Abbott, and Eli Lilly; none of the operative facts arose in Missouri.
- GlaxoSmithKline is organized and has its principal place of business in Delaware but is registered to do business in Missouri and maintains a Missouri registered agent.
- GlaxoSmithKline moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or alternatively to transfer venue to Northern District of Florida; plaintiffs agreed transfer was appropriate.
- Court denied dismissal (found consent to jurisdiction by registration) and granted transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the Northern District of Florida.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Missouri courts have general jurisdiction over GlaxoSmithKline | Registration and in-state agent mean consent to suit on any claim | Company is incorporated and headquartered in Delaware, so not "at home" in Missouri | No general jurisdiction; Daimler controls (company not "at home") |
| Whether Missouri has specific jurisdiction over GlaxoSmithKline for these claims | N/A (plaintiffs concede claims did not arise from Missouri conduct) | Suit-related contacts are in Delaware/Florida, not Missouri | No specific jurisdiction — claims do not arise from Missouri contacts |
| Whether corporate registration and designation of a registered agent constitutes consent to jurisdiction for transitory claims | Registration and agent appointment amount to consent to be sued in Missouri on any claim | Daimler and recent Supreme Court decisions require Due Process minimum-contacts analysis independent of registration | Registration/agent under Missouri statutes constitutes consent; court follows Knowlton and Missouri precedent — consent supplies personal jurisdiction |
| Whether transfer to Northern District of Florida is appropriate and under which statute (§1404(a) vs §1406(a)) | Plaintiffs favored transfer to Northern District of Florida; Northern District has specific jurisdiction and connections to the claims | GlaxoSmithKline sought transfer if not dismissed | Because Missouri had jurisdiction (consent), transfer under §1404(a) granted for convenience and interest of justice; venue proper and forum factors favor Florida |
Key Cases Cited
- Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela Techs. Corp., 760 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2014) (prima facie burden and five-factor specific jurisdiction test)
- Steen v. Murray, 770 F.3d 698 (8th Cir. 2014) (transfer statute choice and choice-of-law consequences)
- Eggleton v. Plasser & Theurer Exp. Von Bahnbaumaschinen Gesellschaft, MBH, 495 F.3d 582 (8th Cir. 2007) (venue proper only where personal jurisdiction exists over all defendants)
- Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1990) (corporate registration and agent designation can constitute consent to suit for any cause of action)
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (general jurisdiction limited to forum where corporation is "at home")
- Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (suit-related contacts must be created by defendant and form substantial connection)
- Atlantic Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013) (private and public interest factors for §1404(a) transfers)
- Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962) (§1406(a) transfer as alternative to dismissal for improper venue)