MITCHELL v. COLVIN
1:14-cv-01112
S.D. Ind.Jun 26, 2015Background
- Plaintiff Prudence Anessa Mitchell applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (DIB) with an alleged onset date of September 10, 2010; the ALJ denied benefits and the Appeals Council affirmed, making the ALJ decision final.
- Ms. Mitchell alleges primarily chronic back problems from a work injury (thoracic/lumbar degenerative disc disease, disc protrusion at T11–T12) and related limitations; providers recommended physical therapy and one treating physician noted lifelong positional limits.
- Additional alleged impairments include carpal tunnel syndrome, obesity, neuropathy, and mental conditions (depression, anxiety, ADD, PTSD); consultative exams showed largely normal motor/sensory findings and intact grip/fine motor skills.
- Treating physician Dr. Bobzien signed a 2012 statement declaring Mitchell disabled; his clinical findings relied substantially on a nurse practitioner’s reports rather than independent objective testing.
- The ALJ found Mitchell insured through Dec. 31, 2015; severe impairments were thoracic degenerative disc disease and obesity; RFC—light work with limitations; concluded she could perform past relevant work (real estate agent and gift wrapper) and was not disabled.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ failed to address carpal tunnel syndrome severity | Mitchell: ALJ ignored/failed to label severity of carpal tunnel and explain rationale | Commissioner: ALJ discussed EMG, normal exam findings, and consultative exam showing normal grip/fine motor skills, supporting non-severe finding | Court: ALJ adequately considered carpal tunnel and rationale supports non-severe conclusion |
| Whether ALJ improperly failed to give controlling weight to treating physician Dr. Bobzien | Mitchell: Dr. Bobzien treated her >2 years and opined she is disabled; ALJ should have given controlling weight | Commissioner: Opinion that claimant is "disabled" is an administrative determination reserved to SSA; Bobzien’s opinion lacked objective support and relied on NP findings | Court: ALJ properly declined controlling weight; treating statement was conclusory/unsupported and not entitled to special weight |
| Whether ALJ failed to consider severity of mental impairments (depression, anxiety, ADD, PTSD) | Mitchell: ALJ erred in finding mental impairments non-severe and in rejecting PTSD/ADD as medically determinable | Commissioner: Consultative, treating, and state-reviewer evidence showed only mild limitations; no extended decompensation; some exams within normal limits | Court: ALJ reasonably evaluated paragraph B areas, found only mild limitations, and permissibly concluded mental impairments were non-severe or not medically determinable |
| Whether ALJ’s RFC and step-four finding are supported by substantial evidence | Mitchell: RFC and step-four finding inconsistent with her reported limitations and treating opinions | Commissioner: RFC based on medical records, consultative exams, and reviewer opinions; RFC permits past relevant jobs | Court: Substantial evidence supports RFC and finding that Mitchell can perform past relevant work; decision affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (RFC is claimant's maximum capacity despite limitations)
- Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2001) (definition of substantial evidence)
- Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2008) (court may not reweigh evidence)
- Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2010) (ALJ must build an "accurate and logical bridge" to conclusions)
- Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1993) (ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence)
- Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 1994) (ALJ must consider all relevant evidence)
- Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2004) (ALJ must articulate minimal, legitimate justification for weighing evidence)
- Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2003) (treating physician entitled to controlling weight if supported by objective evidence)
- Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2004) (treating-source opinion standards)
- Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987) (definition of basic work activities and severity threshold)
- Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2004) (requirement to provide "accurate and logical bridge")
