Mitchell v. Advanced HCS
28 F.4th 580
| 5th Cir. | 2022Background:
- Emma Mitchell, a Texas nursing-home resident, died of pneumonia/complications from COVID-19; her son Troy Mitchell (executor) sued Wedgewood nursing home in Texas state court for medical, corporate, and gross negligence.
- Both parties are Texas citizens; Wedgewood removed to federal court asserting federal jurisdiction; Mitchell moved to remand.
- Wedgewood invoked three federal jurisdictional theories: (1) PREP Act complete preemption/ immunity and compensation-fund scheme; (2) Grable significant-federal-issue jurisdiction; and (3) federal-officer removal (28 U.S.C. §1442) based on CDC/CMS guidance and "critical infrastructure" status.
- The PREP Act provides immunity for injuries related to covered countermeasures, an administrative compensation fund as the primary remedy, and an exclusive federal cause of action only for willful misconduct (adjudicated in D.C.), with willful-misconduct defined as a standard stricter than negligence.
- The district court remanded, holding the PREP Act did not completely preempt negligence claims; the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding none of the three asserted federal doctrines supported removal and directing further remand to state court.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the PREP Act completely preempts state-law negligence claims | Mitchell: claims are ordinary state negligence causes of action and not removable | Wedgewood: PREP Act's immunity, compensation fund, and exclusive federal scheme displace state law and create federal jurisdiction | No — PREP Act only creates a federal cause for willful misconduct (more stringent than negligence); the fund does not satisfy the complete-preemption elements, so negligence claims are not completely preempted |
| Whether Grable creates federal-question jurisdiction | Mitchell: complaint pleads only state law; any federal issues are defensive | Wedgewood: PREP Act immunity and agency guidance raise substantial federal issues implicating Grable | No — federal issues are defensive/not on the face of the complaint; Grable’s narrow, four-part test fails |
| Whether federal-officer removal (§1442) applies | Mitchell: Wedgewood was not acting under a federal officer/agency | Wedgewood: designation as critical infrastructure, CDC/CMS guidance, and detailed regulation mean it acted under federal direction | No — Wedgewood failed to show a subordinate "acting under" relationship; designation/regulation and permissive guidance do not meet Watson’s standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (establishes limits of defensive preemption and the well-pleaded complaint rule)
- Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 ("could have brought" test for complete preemption)
- Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (complete preemption doctrine overview)
- Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142 (limits on §1442 removal—"acting under" requires subordinate relationship and assistance to federal duties)
- Elam v. Kan. Cty. S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796 (5th Cir.) (example of statutory scheme that produced complete preemption under ICCTA)
- Maglioli v. All. HC Holdings LLC, 16 F.4th 393 (3d Cir.) (similar holding that PREP Act does not completely preempt negligence claims)
- In re WTC Disaster Site Litig., 414 F.3d 352 (2d Cir.) (ATSSSA analysis distinguishing compensation fund from a federal cause of action)
- Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286 (5th Cir.) (articulating §1442 removal elements)
- Buljic v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 22 F.4th 730 (8th Cir.) (rejection of "critical infrastructure" designation as sufficient for §1442 removal)