Mitchell Kane v. City Of Seattle, Jonathon Hilton & Bethany Community Church
74638-3
| Wash. Ct. App. | Mar 27, 2017Background
- On July 9, 2014, Mitchell Kane was struck in an intersection while lawfully crossing on a moped; he suffered serious injuries. The other driver, Jonathon Hilton, was intoxicated and later pled guilty to vehicular assault.
- Hilton told police and testified that he failed to stop at the stop sign and did not know why he missed it; his blood alcohol was .116.
- Bethany Community Church owned a crabapple tree near the intersection; photographs show branches that, at some points on Hilton’s approach, obscured the stop sign.
- Kane sued Bethany (and others), alleging Bethany negligently failed to trim the tree so drivers could see the stop sign, and that this negligence proximately caused his injuries.
- Hilton’s deposition testimony was equivocal: he acknowledged the photo showed branches obscuring the sign at one vantage point but repeatedly said he did not know why he failed to stop and could not testify the branches caused his failure to stop.
- The trial court granted Bethany’s summary judgment motion for lack of causation; the court also denied Kane’s motion to amend to add a nuisance claim as futile.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kane proved causation for negligence | Kane: tree branches obscured the sign so Hilton could not see or react in time, causing the collision | Bethany: sole proximate cause was Hilton’s failure to obey the law (and his intoxication); no proof the tree caused the failure to stop | Court: Affirmed summary judgment for Bethany — plaintiff failed to establish causation |
| Whether Hilton’s testimony and other evidence create a material factual dispute | Kane: passenger statement, photos, and experts show sign was not visible at necessary distance | Bethany: Hilton’s repeated statements that he does not know why he missed the sign defeats causal proof | Court: Hilton’s equivocal/photo-based statements are speculative and do not establish causation |
| Whether speculative inferences suffice to survive summary judgment | Kane: alternative inferences (might have stopped if sign visible) create an issue of fact | Bethany: speculation cannot substitute for proof of causation | Court: Speculation is insufficient; plaintiff must show but-for causation |
| Whether leave to amend to add nuisance claim should be granted | Kane: nuisance claim based on same conduct as negligence should be allowed | Bethany: amendment would be futile because nuisance claim depends on the same negligent act and fails for lack of causation | Court: Denial of leave to amend affirmed as futile |
Key Cases Cited
- Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wn.2d 6 (1976) (summary judgment standard and appellate review principles)
- Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wn.2d 254 (1985) (factual causation can become a question of law when inferences are plain)
- Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., 106 Wn.2d 1 (1986) (nonmoving party may not rely on speculation to defeat summary judgment)
- Kristjanson v. City of Seattle, 25 Wn. App. 324 (1980) (obscured signs and impaired driver: speculation as to what might have prevented a collision is insufficient)
- Little v. Countrywood Homes, Inc., 132 Wn. App. 777 (2006) (failure to prove more-probable-than-not causation warrants summary judgment)