Missouri v. Frye
132 S. Ct. 1399
| SCOTUS | 2012Background
- Frye was charged in Missouri with driving with a revoked license, charged as a class D felony with up to four years’ imprisonment; prior convictions increased exposure.
- Prosecutor offered two formal plea bargains in August 2007, both expiring December 28, without defense counsel informing Frye; offers later expired.
- Frye’s December 30, 2007 arrest led to a January 4, 2008 hearing where he pleaded guilty to the charged felony, receiving a three-year sentence.
- Frye sought postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance for failing to communicate the plea offers; Missouri Court of Appeals found prejudice due to lapse, remanding for remedy.
- This Court granted certiorari to address whether counsel’s failure to communicate plea offers constitutes ineffective assistance and how prejudice should be evaluated.
- The companion Lafler v. Cooper case addresses related issues about prejudice and remedy in plea negotiations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel must communicate formal plea offers to the defendant | Frye—counsel failed to communicate the offer, causing ineffective assistance | State—no constitutional entitlement to a plea offer or its communication | Yes; counsel must communicate formal offers that may be favorable |
| How to measure prejudice when a plea offer lapses or is rejected | Frye would have accepted earlier offer but for counsel’s failure | Prejudice depends on state-law feasibility to adhere to or reject the offer | Prejudice requires showing a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome from the earlier offer, considering state-law adherence/approval possibilities |
| Role of state law in whether a plea offer can be withdrawn or rejected | State may permit withdrawal of an accepted offer without recourse; affects prejudice analysis | Trial court discretion and prosecutorial withdrawal affect outcome | Remand to address state-law questions on withdrawal/adherence and trial-court acceptance; prejudice depends on those outcomes |
| Whether the right extends to pre-trial plea negotiations as such | Plea-bargaining is critical to the process; ineffective assistance can occur before trial | No guaranteed right to a plea offer; focus on fair conviction | Yes; plea negotiations are a critical phase, and defense counsel’s duties during plea bargaining are constitutionally constrained |
Key Cases Cited
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52 (1985) (ineffective assistance in plea context assessed for prejudice from trial-after-plea decisions)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356 (2010) (negotiation of plea is a critical phase; counsel must advise on consequences of plea)
- Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545 (1977) (no right to receive a plea offer; but-related protections apply to other stages)
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257 (1971) (prosecution/ court discretion in plea agreements affects enforceability)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance; prejudice/ deficient performance standard)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (prejudice analysis in plea negotiations; companion to Frye)