Missoula Electric Cooperative v. Jon Cruson, Inc., 2016 MT 267

Missoula Electric Cooperative (MEC) and IBEW Local 44 entered a CBA that, together with an Apprenticeship Agreement, created a Joint Apprentice Training Committee (JATC) to select and train lineman apprentices. The JATC was composed of four members selected two-by-two by MEC and the Union.
Jon Cruson, a MEC employee, applied for a newly created apprentice lineman position in 2012; the JATC interviewed candidates, recommended a first choice (not Cruson), and ranked Cruson in a three-way tie for second. MEC did not approve the JATC’s recommended candidate and initially hired no one.
Cruson and two similarly aged coworkers filed a grievance with the Union asserting age discrimination; the Union did not pursue it. Cruson then filed an age-discrimination complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau.
A Bureau investigator issued reasonable-cause findings for Cruson and another older candidate. MEC ordered the JATC to reconvene; the JATC then selected Cruson, MEC offered the position, and Cruson declined to accept while pursuing his complaint.
MEC moved for summary judgment at the administrative hearing, arguing the JATC was not its agent. The Hearing Examiner granted summary judgment for MEC. The Human Rights Commission reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact about an agency relationship, and remanded. The District Court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the Commission and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the JATC acted as MEC’s agent so MEC may be liable for JATC members’ alleged discriminatory statements	Cruson: MEC delegated authority to and exercised control over the JATC (HR rep participated; MEC ordered reconvening; MEC preferred candidate), creating a factual dispute on agency	MEC: JATC was an independent joint committee created under the CBA/Agreement; governed to act independently and therefore not MEC’s agent as a matter of law	Court: Reversed summary judgment — sufficient factual evidence exists to create genuine issues about agency that preclude summary judgment and warrant further proceedings

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Envtl. Review, 347 Mont. 415, 199 P.3d 191 (discussing standard of review for agency conclusions)
Indian Health Bd. v. Mont. Dep’t of Labor, 341 Mont. 411, 177 P.3d 1029 (same)
Hofer v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Health and Human Servs., 329 Mont. 368, 124 P.3d 1098 (administrative review limitations)
Hajenga v. Schwein, 336 Mont. 507, 155 P.3d 1241 (summary judgment as extreme remedy)
Lee v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 304 Mont. 356, 22 P.3d 631 (summary judgment standards)
Roe v. City of Missoula, 354 Mont. 1, 221 P.3d 1200 (Rule 56 and burdens on movant/nonmovant)
Corporate Air v. Edwards Jet Ctr., 345 Mont. 336, 190 P.3d 1111 (summary judgment burdens and standard)