Mirna Villegas Rendon v. William P. Barr
952 F.3d 963
| 8th Cir. | 2020Background
- Mirna Villegas Rendon, a Mexican national, was convicted in Minnesota (Apr. 24, 2017) of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine and tramadol). DHS served a Notice to Appear charging inadmissibility for unlawful presence and removability for a controlled-substance offense.
- Rendon claimed she reentered the U.S. in 2004 by pretending to be asleep in a car (arguing admission under Matter of Quilantan) and sought relief including asylum, withholding, and cancellation; she also sought termination to pursue military parole-in-place based on her spouse’s prior Navy service.
- The IJ initially sustained the unlawful-entry charge, initially declined then later sustained the controlled-substance charge, and denied asylum (as untimely), withholding, and termination requests. Rendon appealed to the BIA and moved to remand under Pereira; the BIA dismissed the appeal and denied remand.
- The Eighth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision; jurisdiction over the controlled-substance removability issue exists as a question of law despite the criminal-alien review bar.
- The court concluded Minnesota’s statute is divisible, applied the modified categorical approach to Rendon’s plea (which identified methamphetamine), held Rendon removable for a controlled-substance offense, and rejected the other challenges as either factual (barred from review) or discretionary.
Issues
| Issue | Rendon’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Controlled-substance removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) | MN §152.025 is overbroad/indivisible, so conviction does not categorically support removability | Statute is divisible; plea documents show conviction for methamphetamine, a federally controlled substance | Statute is divisible; modified categorical approach shows conviction was for methamphetamine, so removable |
| Lawful entry / inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) | Rendon testified she gained admission in 2004 by feigning sleep in a car (Quilantan) | IJ/BIA found testimony not credible and inconsistent | Credibility finding is factual; review barred by criminal-alien bar; claim not reviewed on merits |
| Relief applications: asylum timeliness (extraordinary circumstances) and withholding of removal | Childhood sexual abuse and trauma excuse one-year asylum filing; Rendon is member of protected groups and Mexico cannot/will not protect her | IJ/BIA found evidence insufficient to show trauma prevented timely filing and insufficient proof Mexico unable/unwilling to protect | Both determinations are factual (severity of impairment and government inability/unwillingness) and are barred from review under the criminal-alien bar |
| Motion to terminate proceedings to pursue military parole-in-place | Termination should be granted so Rendon can seek parole-in-place from USCIS (spouse is a former service member) | IJ lacks authority to terminate on that ground; parole-in-place is DHS/USCIS discretion, not an IJ termination ground | IJ did not abuse discretion; BIA properly declined to terminate because parole-in-place is a DHS discretionary remedy |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (U.S. 2016) (establishes divisibility inquiry under categorical approach)
- Martinez v. Sessions, 893 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2018) (applies divisibility/modified categorical approach to state drug statutes)
- Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2017) (standard of review for BIA factual findings)
- Brikova v. Holder, 699 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2012) (criminal-alien review bar limits appellate jurisdiction to legal and constitutional questions)
- Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) (notice-to-appear timing requirements; referenced by petitioner but not dispositive here)
- Hanggi v. Holder, 563 F.3d 378 (8th Cir. 2009) (limits on IJ authority to terminate proceedings)