Mireles, Gustavo Lopez, WR-76,258-03

Background

Gustavo L. Mireles was convicted (trial in Aug. 2002) of a homicide and sentenced to life; the State’s case relied heavily on DNA testing performed Dec. 12, 2001 by DPS McAllen analyst Orlando Ochoa.
Ochoa testified at trial that he used CODIS procedures but in fact compared only 9 STR loci and reported matches of only 2–3 loci for some items; he nevertheless testified to "consistent/positive" matches.
After conviction, DPS McAllen laboratory was audited and temporarily closed (2003); the audit revealed procedural problems and prompted re‑evaluation of many cases. Mireles alleges his case was among those and that he was not notified.
In 2014 Mireles (pro se) filed a Motion to Conduct a Court of Inquiry and a Motion for Disclosure asserting (1) the McAllen lab and Ochoa violated CODIS/FBI quality standards (13‑loci core requirement), (2) Ochoa committed perjury/other crimes and the lab/DA/judges failed to safeguard due process, and (3) Brady/Giglio material was suppressed.
The 139th District Court denied the court‑of‑inquiry motion for lack of substantial facts/probable cause (Aug. 14, 2014). The Thirteenth Court of Appeals dismissed Mireles’s appeals from the 139th and 206th trial‑court orders for lack of jurisdiction (Oct. 9 and Dec. 18, 2014). Mireles seeks mandamus relief and review by the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Mireles)	Defendant's Argument (State/Respondents)	Held
1. Whether a court of inquiry should have been ordered	Mireles: Ochoa’s DNA testing violated DPS/FBI CODIS standards (13‑loci); testing produced unreliable "matches" (2–3 loci) and thus probable cause exists that crimes (perjury, tampering) were committed and a court of inquiry is warranted.	State: Trial judge found a lack of substantial facts/probable cause to convene a court of inquiry.	Trial court denied; Court of Appeals held motion to conduct a court of inquiry is not an appealable order and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Whether Mireles is entitled to disclosure (Brady/Giglio) of DPS re‑evaluation and other exculpatory material	Mireles: DPS audit/closure and re‑evaluation of ~300 cases/records are Brady material; failure to disclose re‑testing or methodology undermines confidence in the conviction and entitles him to disclosure and relief.	State: Trial court denied disclosure; Court of Appeals held denial not an appealable order and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.	Motion for disclosure denied at trial; appellate dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
3. Whether the McAllen DPS lab testing met applicable standards and whether analyst committed perjury/other crimes	Mireles: Lab used outdated SOPs, instruments, and did not meet FBI/CODIS quality assurance; Ochoa knowingly testified to false/defective results (aggravated perjury, tampering, false report).	State/DA/Lab: Implicit defense is that procedures and testimony were admissible and/or that any deficiencies do not warrant postconviction relief; appeals courts treated procedural posture (nonappealable) rather than merits.	Trial and appellate courts did not reach merits; procedural rulings prevented substantive adjudication in these appeals.
4. Jurisdictional/mandamus relief: whether appellate courts could review district judge rulings on these pretrial/postconviction motions	Mireles: Court of Appeals erred in dismissing appeal; denial of court of inquiry and disclosure raises substantial state & federal law issues and is reviewable; mandamus to compel ruling or disclosure is proper.	Courts: Chapter 52 does not provide for appeal from a magistrate’s decision on a motion to convene a court of inquiry; the appellate courts dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.	Appellate courts dismissed appeals for lack of jurisdiction; Mireles must pursue relief through the Court of Criminal Appeals or via mandamus in appropriate forum.

Key Cases Cited

Cockerham v. Cain, 283 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2002) (due‑process/Brady principles and postconviction relief standards cited)
U.S. v. Kirk, 528 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2008) (plain and obvious trial errors affecting substantial rights may warrant relief)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution’s suppression of materially favorable evidence violates due process)
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (Brady and duty to disclose material evidence applies even absent a request)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence related to government witnesses must be disclosed)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (prosecutor has duty to learn of favorable evidence known to others acting on the government’s behalf)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (standard for materiality of suppressed evidence under Brady)
In re Court of Inquiry, 148 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004) (Chapter 52 does not provide for appeal from a judge’s determination on a motion to conduct a court of inquiry)
McCarver v. State, 257 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008) (a party may appeal only that which the legislature has authorized)
Olowosuko v. State, 826 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (principle that a party may appeal only what the legislature authorizes)