Mirando v. United States Department of Treasury, 766 F.3d 540

Mirando pleaded guilty in 2007 to conspiracy to defraud the United States and four counts of tax evasion (1995, 1996, 2000, 2004) and signed a plea agreement stipulating that his total tax liability (with interest and penalties) was $448,776.13.
Prior to the 2007 plea, Mirando had earlier convictions (2001) for fraud and tax evasion and had made pre-plea payments to the IRS totaling $467,686.04.
In 2008 Mirando (and his ex-wife) filed amended returns seeking refunds for 1995, 1996, and 2000 totaling about $125,315; the IRS denied the claims and Mirando sued for refund.
The government answered but did not initially plead estoppel as an affirmative defense; during summary-judgment briefing it first sought collateral estoppel, then abandoned that theory in reply and asserted judicial estoppel for the first time.
Mirando moved for leave to file a surreply to address the new judicial-estoppel argument; the district court granted the government summary judgment on judicial estoppel without explicitly ruling on the surreply motion.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding Mirando was judicially estopped from pursuing the refund and that any denial of leave to file a surreply was not an abuse of discretion or was harmless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Mirando is barred by judicial estoppel from suing for tax refunds after stipulating in his plea that he owed $448,776.13	Mirando: plea does not clearly stipulate to the numerical accuracy (ambiguities in attachment, prior payments, and differing tax years) so judicial estoppel does not apply	Govt: plea unequivocally stipulates to the exact liability; allowing refund suit would be contrary and would create unfair advantage and cynical gamesmanship	Held: Affirmed — plea unambiguously stipulated to the $448,776.13 liability; all three judicial-estoppel factors satisfied, so Mirando is estopped
Whether the district court abused its discretion by not granting leave to file a surreply after the government raised judicial estoppel in its reply brief	Mirando: he was deprived of meaningful opportunity to respond to a new, dispositive argument raised in reply	Govt: reply raised no new evidence, only an argument based on undisputed plea facts; surreply unnecessary	Held: Affirmed — no abuse of discretion because the reply relied on existing undisputed facts; any error would be harmless because Mirando’s proposed surreply lacked substantive challenge to most estoppel prongs

New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine applied at court's discretion)
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, LLP, 546 F.3d 752 (6th Cir.) (caution in applying judicial estoppel; doctrine prevents cynical gamesmanship)
Hammon, [citation="277 F. App'x 560"] (6th Cir.) (distinguishes stipulations that approximate liability from unequivocal numerical stipulations)
Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 339 F.3d 454 (6th Cir.) (reply briefs that introduce new evidence require an opportunity to respond under Rule 56)
Baez, 87 F.3d 805 (6th Cir.) (Rule 11 requirement that court determine factual basis for plea; written factual admissions can satisfy the rule)
Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 911 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir.) (judicial acceptance includes adoption of a party's position as part of a final disposition)