Miranda v. Anchondo
684 F.3d 844
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- Petitioner Miranda was convicted by the Pascua Yaqui Tribal Court on eight tribal criminal code violations arising from a single incident; tribal sentence totaled 910 days (two 365-day terms, two 90-day terms, two 60-day terms, two 30-day terms) with 114 days time served deducted.
- District court granted Miranda’s amended habeas petition, holding ICRA § 1302(7) barred consecutive sentences beyond one year for multiple offenses from a single transaction.
- Respondents appealed; magistrate judge recommended summary judgment in Miranda’s favor, adopting Spears v. Red Lake Band reasoning that § 1302(7) limits punishment per offense.
- Objections to the magistrate’s report were filed late but considered on the merits by the district court, which maintained that § 1302(7) bars cumulative sentences.
- Ninth Circuit reviews de novo the interpretation of § 1302(7) and whether objections to a magistrate judge’s ruling waive appellate rights.
- Court reverses district court, holding § 1302(7) unambiguously permits up to one year per discrete offense, so Miranda’s eight offenses permit more than one year total under the statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether untimely objections waived on appeal | Miranda | Anchondo/Nielsen | No waiver; ordinary presumption allows appeal on legal conclusions. |
| Whether § 1302(7) permits >1 year per offense | Miranda | Anchondo/Nielsen | Yes; statute unambiguous per-offense cap up to one year. |
| Meaning of 'offense' in 1968 | Miranda | Anchondo/Nielsen | Offense means a criminal violation with separate elements; not a single transaction. |
| Use of legislative history when text is clear | Miranda | Anchondo/Nielsen | Disallowed; text is clear; history not consulted to create ambiguity. |
| Effect of Bell and double jeopardy context | Miranda | Anchondo/Nielsen | Bell does not imply a single offense per transaction; modern interpretation supports per-offense cap. |
Key Cases Cited
- McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1980) (broad waiver rule not good law (clarified later))
- Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991) (waiver not automatic; objections alone insufficient for waiver)
- Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007) (failure to object does not automatically waive appeal on legal conclusions)
- Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999) (objection default rules; weighability of waiver)
- United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (de novo standard for Habeas and statutory interpretation)
- Robbins v. Carey, cited above, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007) (see above)
- Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) (limits on turning a single transaction into multiple offenses)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (same act vs. separate elements determines offenses)
- Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (separate offenses created by Congress; multiple offenses in single transaction)
- Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) (ordinary meaning applied in statutory interpretation)
- Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239 (1972) (in pari materia and interpretation consistency)
- Dugan & McNamara, Inc. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 801 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (illustrative historical meaning of ‘offense’)
- Spears v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (D. Minn. 2005) (早)
- McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1980) (reiterated waiver concerns)