Miranda Rose Mraz v. State
2016 WY 85
| Wyo. | 2016Background
- Miranda Mraz worked as a server at the Firewater Grill; management discovered multiple credit/debit card receipts with altered (inflated) tip amounts tied to transactions she handled.
- Management reviewed transactions, met with Mraz, then broadened the review and ultimately terminated her employment; police were notified and received transaction documents.
- The State charged Mraz with seven counts of felony forgery (altering writings) and one count of misdemeanor theft (taking money by charging increased tips).
- Trial evidence included merchant/customer credit card receipts showing alterations, Maitre’D "Summary of Sales" reports generated under Mraz’s server ID showing inflated tips, customers’ testimony that their receipts had been altered, and labor records showing Mraz checked out shortly after preparing summaries.
- A jury convicted Mraz on all counts; she appealed raising vindictive prosecution, ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, failure to give a supplemental jury definition of "forgery," and insufficiency of the evidence.
- The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed: it found the evidence sufficient (corroboration beyond mere opportunity), and rejected each of Mraz’s other claims under applicable standards (including plain-error review where appropriate).
Issues
| Issue | Mraz's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for forgery/theft | Evidence only showed opportunity; opportunity-alone cannot sustain conviction | Records (altered receipts, summaries under her server ID, customer ID, labor reports) corroborate that Mraz received cash for inflated tips | Affirmed — evidence (circumstantial + corroboration) could support convictions |
| Vindictive prosecution | Prosecution was retaliatory after Mraz successfully appealed a prior larceny conviction; prosecution resources out of proportion to losses | Charges arose from wholly separate facts; no evidence of actual or presumptive vindictiveness | No plain error — no actual vindictiveness and no presumption (different offenses/circumstances) |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel | Trial counsel failed to exploit inconsistencies in managers’ testimony about timing of investigation | Cross-examination choices were reasonable strategy; highlighting those inconsistencies risked bolstering witnesses and added little value | Denied — performance not shown deficient nor prejudicial under Strickland |
| Prosecutorial misconduct (closing) | Prosecutor misstated evidence by implying Mraz was "caught" changing method after being confronted | Prosecutor’s comment was a vague inference arguably supported by testimony of initial confrontation | No plain error — isolated/vague remark did not materially prejudice trial |
| Supplemental jury instruction on "forgery" | Court should have defined "forgery" when jurors asked | Court correctly told jurors to rely on the statutory-elements instructions; giving an expanded definition could have misstated law | No plain error — instructions tracked the statute; court properly declined additional definition |
Key Cases Cited
- Bean v. State, 373 P.3d 372 (Wyo. 2016) (standard for sufficiency review)
- Guerrero v. State, 277 P.3d 735 (Wyo. 2012) (sufficiency review principles)
- Hill v. State, 371 P.3d 553 (Wyo. 2016) (prosecutor argument must be supported by record)
- Lopez v. State, 139 P.3d 445 (Wyo. 2006) (framework for vindictive prosecution burden shifting)
- United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (U.S. 1982) (reason for narrow presumption of vindictiveness)
- Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (U.S. 1974) (presumption where government increases charges after defendant exercises rights)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Humphrey v. United States, 888 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing separate subsequent indictments from vindictive-prosecution presumption)