Miranda-Bojorquez v. Barr, 937 F.3d 1

Background

Miranda, a Salvadoran who entered the U.S. unlawfully at 17, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief after alleging childhood race-based abuse by relatives in El Salvador and later attacks in Chelsea, Massachusetts.
Police and DHS/HSI records identified Miranda as a verified, active MS-13 member; Miranda denied current or past gang involvement at immigration hearings.
The IJ found Miranda credible as to past race-based abuse (past persecution) but concluded he lacked a well-founded fear of future race-based persecution because his primary persecutor (his aunt) is deceased and no other persecutors were identified.
The IJ also found Miranda no longer belonged to his proposed social group of "male minor children dependent on and who cannot leave their families," because he is now an adult and had previously left abusive family members.
The IJ issued an adverse credibility finding about Miranda's denials of gang affiliation based on government reports and other testimony; denied humanitarian asylum as an exercise of discretion given perceived gang ties and public-safety concerns; BIA affirmed.
Miranda petitioned for review challenging the social-group and future-persecution findings, denial of humanitarian asylum (arguing the court relied on unreliable, unauthenticated police reports), and a Fifth Amendment due-process violation. The First Circuit denied review.

Issues

Issue	Miranda's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Miranda belongs to a "particular social group" (male minor dependents who cannot leave their families)	Miranda: he is a member of that protected social group based on his history of dependency and inability to leave abusive relatives as a child	Government: Miranda is now an adult and record shows he was able to leave his abusive family while a minor, so he is not a member	Held: Substantial evidence supports agency finding that Miranda is not a member of the proposed social group (he is now an adult and had left family previously)
Whether Miranda has a well‑founded fear of future race‑based persecution	Miranda: past race‑based abuse creates a presumption of future persecution that the government failed to rebut	Government: presumption rebutted by a fundamental change in circumstances (death of aunt Virginia) and no evidence of other racially motivated persecutors	Held: Government rebutted presumption; substantial evidence supports denial of asylum on future‑fear grounds
Whether denial of humanitarian asylum was an abuse of discretion because agency relied on unreliable/unauthenticated police and government reports	Miranda: reports were hearsay, unreliable, prepared when he was incapacitated, and the IJ’s reliance violated fairness and his ability to rebut; thus humanitarian asylum should have been granted	Government: reports were properly authenticated, IJ afforded Miranda opportunity to rebut, and immigration proceedings permit relaxed evidentiary rules; public‑safety concerns and other negative evidence weighed against relief	Held: Denial of humanitarian asylum affirmed—IJ permissibly considered government reports, gave Miranda chance to rebut, and permissibly exercised discretion given evidence of gang affiliation
Whether reliance on government reports violated Miranda’s due process rights	Miranda: use of those reports without adequate opportunity to refute caused fundamental unfairness and prejudice	Government: no procedural error; Miranda had opportunity to challenge reports; presumption of regularity attaches to official reports	Held: No due process violation shown; petitioner failed to show procedural error or prejudice

Key Cases Cited

Urgilez Méndez v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 566 (1st Cir. 2018) (standard of deferential review of asylum denials)
Ordonez-Quino v. Holder, 760 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2014) (substantial‑evidence review of credibility and persecution findings)
Santos-Guaman v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2018) (past persecution gives rise to presumption of future persecution; government may rebut)
Martínez-Pérez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2018) (framework for humanitarian asylum as discretionary relief for extraordinary past suffering)
Precetaj v. Holder, 649 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2011) (humanitarian asylum requires past persecution so severe repatriation would be inhumane)
Arias-Minaya v. Holder, 779 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2015) (police reports admissible when agency finds reliability and affords opportunity to challenge)
Cabas v. Barr, 928 F.3d 177 (1st Cir. 2019) (immigration evidentiary standards are generally more relaxed than in criminal courts)
Conde Cuatzo v. Lynch, 796 F.3d 153 (1st Cir. 2015) (procedural fairness standard and IJ discretion over evidence)