Mirabella v. Town of Lexington, MA, 64 F.4th 55

Background

Salvatore Mirabella Jr., a former Lexington police officer, sued the Town of Lexington and retired Chief Mark Corr, claiming (1) due-process defects in his termination from the Lexington police and (2) intentional interference with advantageous relations (IIAR) when Corr allegedly harmed Mirabella’s later bid for employment with the Bentley Police Department (BPD).
BPD declined to hire Mirabella after a background check. BPD’s written report stated that Mirabella’s “lack of cooperation” — an incomplete home visit to inspect firearms — disqualified him and the background investigation was discontinued.
Corr had told a BPD investigator that Mirabella would “stir things up” and use union experience to agitate if hired; Mirabella says Corr’s comments damaged his prospects and that BPD’s home-visit explanation was pretextual.
The district court granted summary judgment to the Town and Corr on all claims. Mirabella appealed; the First Circuit affirmed, largely adopting the district court’s reasoning, but the panel opinion included a separate concurring majority opinion and a dissent by Judge Lipez limited to the IIAR claim against Corr.
The majority concluded (1) Mirabella waived the pretext theory by not pressing it squarely below or developing it on appeal, and (2) even on the merits the record lacks competent evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer BPD’s stated reason was pretext and that Corr’s comments caused the adverse employment action.
The dissent argued that Mirabella presented circumstantial evidence creating a genuine fact issue (conflicting accounts of the home visit, Corr’s damaging union-related statements, and timing) that a jury could credit to find pretext and causation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Preservation of pretext theory on appeal	Mirabella contends BPD’s home-visit rationale was pretext and adequately raised below and on appeal	Defendants say Mirabella never squarely advanced pretext below or developed it on appeal, so it is waived	Majority: Waived — Mirabella failed to present the theory face-up in district court and on appeal
Sufficiency of evidence to show pretext and causation for IIAR against Corr	Corr’s disclosure of Mirabella’s union activity led BPD to reject him; competing account of the home visit supports pretext	BPD’s written report (incomplete home visit, lack of cooperation) is uncontroverted competent evidence justifying non-hire; alleged inferences are speculative	Majority: No genuine dispute — record lacks definite, competent evidence of pretext or causation; summary judgment proper
Role of circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences at summary judgment	Circumstantial evidence (timing, conflicting accounts, Corr’s comments) can support a jury finding of pretext and harm	Inferences urged stack speculation upon speculation and cannot substitute for competent evidence	Dissent: Circumstantial evidence sufficient to create triable issue; Majority: reasonable inferences do not support pretext here
Summary judgment on remaining claims (including due process)	Mirabella urged errors below on termination/due process	Defendants argued the district court correctly adjudicated those claims on the summary-judgment record	Majority: Affirmed district court on all claims for reasons given in district court opinion

Key Cases Cited

Potvin v. Speedway LLC, 891 F.3d 410 (1st Cir. 2018) (appellate court may adopt district court’s well-reasoned decision without extended additional commentary)
McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1991) (theories not raised squarely in district court cannot be asserted first on appeal)
United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990) (perfunctory or undeveloped issues on appeal are deemed waived)
Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1991) (summary-judgment opposing party must produce definite, competent evidence creating a factual dispute)
Gomez v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 670 F.3d 395 (1st Cir. 2012) (cannot rely on inference-on-inference that stacks speculation to defeat summary judgment)
Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2007) (conjecture cannot replace proof in summary-judgment analysis)
Zingg v. Groblewski, 907 F.3d 630 (1st Cir. 2018) (improbable inferences and unsupported speculation do not establish genuine fact disputes)
Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 777 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015) (summary-judgment standards bar reliance on unsupported speculation)
Alston v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 950, 998 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2021) (court must draw all reasonable inferences for non-movant at summary judgment)
Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (courts need not draw unreasonable inferences for the non-movant)
Moses v. Mele, 711 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2013) (appellate arguments must be presented clearly and squarely)
Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 2006) (arguments in district court must be presented forthrightly to preserve them)
Katz v. Belveron Real Est. Partners, LLC, 28 F.4th 300 (1st Cir. 2022) (Massachusetts elements for intentional interference with advantageous relations)
Blackstone v. Cashman, 860 N.E.2d 7 (Mass. 2007) (Massachusetts formulation of IIAR elements)