Mira Mar Development Corporation v. City of Coppell, Texas, 421 S.W.3d 74

Background

Mira Mar purchased ~18.5 acres to develop a 29‑lot subdivision (Alexander Court) and later sold lots to David Weekley Homes. Disputes arose with City of Coppell over development conditions, delays, design changes, and fees.
Mira Mar sought compensation via a city‑council hearing under Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 212.904; the council’s first hearing procedures were held inadequate and a second, court‑reported hearing was conducted.
After the second hearing the City awarded Mira Mar roughly $31,496 (including some construction costs) and $1,800 attorney’s fees; the trial court later added $8,785 for land under an offsite sidewalk and vacated the attorney’s fee award.
Parties filed competing summary‑judgment motions; the trial court granted the City’s motion, denied Mira Mar’s, and entered judgment awarding Mira Mar $40,280.84 and denying attorney’s fees.
On appeal the court reviewed which developer requirements were compensable exactions (focusing on the Nollan/Dolan/Stafford rough‑proportionality test), which items City proved were roughly proportional, and whether § 212.904 procedures and remedies (including attorney’s fees and standard of review) were applied correctly.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Mira Mar)	Defendant's Argument (Coppell)	Held
Whether various permit conditions were compensable exactions under federal/state takings law	City conditioned approvals on payments/improvements; those are exactions requiring compensation unless roughly proportional	Many conditions were legitimate regulatory requirements or within engineer discretion and were roughly proportional	Court applied Nollan/Dolan/Stafford; split rulings by item — some were compensable, others not
Rolled curbs / street‑width requirement	City’s straight curb requirement increased lot costs and reduced sale price; claimed uncompensated exaction	City made individualized safety determination requiring wider streets with straight curbs; requirement tied to public safety	Requirement upheld as non‑compensable (rough proportionality and nexus established)
Offsite sidewalk (cost + land value)	Entitled to cost + value of land under sidewalk ($21,465)	City paid construction cost but not land value; contested amount	Court rendered judgment awarding full $21,465 (plaintiff prevailed on land value)
Storm‑drain extension, riprap, piers	Required unnecessary extension to creek and extra works — compensable	City engineer asserted necessity to prevent erosion/flooding	Court reversed summary judgment for City on pipe extension/riprap/piers (insufficient evidence of nexus/proportionality); remanded for further proceedings
Tree mitigation ("retribution") fees	Fees ($34,500) were exactions not shown to be roughly proportional to development’s impact	City argued fees advance legitimate public forestry programs and are tied to removed tree inches	Court rendered judgment for Mira Mar: fees not shown to be roughly proportional; $34,500 awarded
Park and inspection fees; construction inspection fees	Fees were exactions and not shown roughly proportional	City asserted fees tied to per‑unit or inspection costs; offered only conclusory testimony	Court reversed on park fees and construction‑inspection fees (City failed to prove rough proportionality); remanded for fact issues on proportional amounts
Water/sewer impact fees and who pays	Mira Mar sought compensation for water/sewer fees passed to builder (reduced lot price)	City: water/sewer fees are paid at building permit by builder, not a conditioned exaction against Mira Mar	Court: water/sewer fees were not exactions against Mira Mar; trial court’s ruling not reviewable on that ground here
Whether trial court should have used trial de novo (and jury) under § 212.904 appeals	Mira Mar: appellate appeal under § 212.904 should be tried de novo in court and compensation issues (amount) are jury issues	City accepted court review but relied on substantial‑evidence review of council	Court: appeal from council on exactions should be trial de novo for mixed legal/constitutional questions; factual takings issues tried to judge but compensation amount (if any) is for jury; remanded to allow appropriate proceedings
Attorney’s fees under § 212.904	Mira Mar argued it prevailed and is entitled to fees for the § 212.904 appeal(s)	City argued Mira Mar did not ‘‘prevail’’ sufficiently (recovery small vs. claimed)	Court reversed denial of fees in part and remanded fee determination to trial court consistent with new rulings (plaintiff recovered on several items and fee remand appropriate)

Key Cases Cited

Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998) (distinguishes physical vs. regulatory takings and takings law principles)
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (establishes essential‑nexus and rough‑proportionality tests for exactions)
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (essential‑nexus requirement for imposed conditions)
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004) (adopts/clarifies rough‑proportionality test in Texas)
FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000) (standards for reviewing cross‑motions for summary judgment)
Riner v. Neumann, 353 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011) (affidavit/conclusory testimony insufficient to support summary judgment)
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979) (limits on affirming grounds not raised below)
Gen. Servs. v. Little‑Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. 2001) (whether facts constitute a taking is question of law)
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (principle that public should bear public burdens fairly)
Intercontinental Group P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2009) (definition of prevailing party for fee awards)