Minor v. United States, 57 A.3d 406

Calvin Minor was convicted of armed carjacking, armed robbery, PFCV, and UUV in D.C.
Minor moved to admit Dr. Fisher’s eyewitness-identification reliability testimony; the trial court initially denied it.
We remanded for a hearing considering Benn II and Russell guidance on eyewitness expert testimony.
On remand, the court again excluded Fisher’s testimony, finding it not helpful to the jury under Dyas.
On appeal, we held all three Dyas factors satisfied and that the testimony was probative and admissible, reversing for a new trial.
The case was remanded for a new trial with Fisher’s expert testimony available to Minor.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Dyas factor one: is the subject beyond the ken of lay jurors?	Minor contends Fisher’s testimony is beyond lay understanding.	Minor argues Hart survey shows lay understanding suffices.	Testimony satisfies first Dyas factor; beyond the ken of lay jurors.
Dyas factor two: does Fisher’s testimony aid the trier of fact?	Fisher’s testimony would aid jurors in evaluating eyewitness reliability.	Court found Fisher’s conclusions equivocal and not helpful.	Fisher’s testimony probably aids the jury; trial court erred in excluding.
Dyas factor three: is the methodology generally accepted (Frye)?	Methodology underlying eyewitness research has general scientific acceptance.	Court found lack of general acceptance or grounding in real-world validity.	Third Dyas prong satisfied; Frye methodology broadly accepted.
Was the exclusion of Fisher’s testimony harmless error?	Excluding Fisher deprived Minor of scientific foundations for defense.	Identifications were uncorroborated; error was harmless because defenses available.	Exclusion was not harmless; reasonable probability it altered verdict in Minor’s favor.

Benn II, 978 A.2d 1257 (D.C. 2009) (eyewitness identification testimony may be admissible under certain conditions)
Russell, 17 A.3d 581 (D.C. 2011) (necessity to weigh expert testimony against juror understanding)
Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977) (three-pronged test for admitting expert testimony)
Adams v. United States, 502 A.2d 1011 (D.C. 1986) (admissibility framework for expert testimony; weight is for the jury)
Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508 (D.C. 2012) (admissibility analysis includes probative value vs prejudicial impact)
Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979) (Dyas factors; relevance and probative value assessment)
Foreman v. United States, 792 A.2d 1043 (D.C. 2002) (trial courts may exclude evidence if probative value is substantially outweighed by prejudice)
Frye v. United States, 293 F. at 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (general acceptance standard for scientific testimony)
Jones v. United States (Frye-related), 27 A.3d 1136 (D.C. 2013) (general acceptance of scientific methodology governs admissibility)
United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013 (D.C. 2005) (general acceptance as prerequisite for reliability)