Minden Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 795 F.3d 997

Minden Pictures is a stock photography licensing agent that entered Agency Agreements (1993–2008) with photographers appointing Minden "sole and exclusive agent" to market, license, and exploit reproduction rights while photographers retained copyright and some limited rights to use or license images themselves.
Minden licensed photographs to publishers including John Wiley & Sons; Minden alleges Wiley reproduced far more copies than permitted by the licenses (e.g., printing hundreds of thousands when licensed for 20,000).
In 2010 some photographers executed assignments purporting to convey ownership interests or litigation rights to Minden; in 2013 additional assignments conveyed co-ownership to Minden (the 2013 Assignments did not automatically terminate after litigation).
Wiley moved to dismiss/for summary judgment arguing Minden lacked statutory standing under the Copyright Act because it was not a legal or beneficial owner of the exclusive rights (i.e., at most held a nonexclusive license).
The district court ruled for Wiley, finding the Agency Agreements did not transfer ownership or an exclusive license sufficient to sue, and declined to consider the 2013 Assignments; Minden appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Minden, as licensing agent under the Agency Agreements, has statutory standing under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) to sue for infringement	Agency Agreements granted Minden an exclusive license (exclusive agent) to reproduce/authorize reproduction, distribution, and display — a legally cognizable interest sufficient to sue	Agreements reserved copyrights to photographers and allowed some photographer licensing, so Minden at best holds a nonexclusive license and lacks standing	Court held Minden had an exclusive license to grant licenses (an ownership interest in exclusive rights) and therefore statutory standing to sue

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (distinguishing statutory standing from Article III jurisdiction)
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004) (procedural posture for jurisdictional vs. merits challenges)
Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (list of exclusive rights under §106 is exhaustive)
Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008) (exclusive licensees can sue under §501(b))
Corbello v. DeVito, 777 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2015) (co-ownership and meaning of "exclusive" in copyright context)
HyperQuest, Inc. v. N’Site Solutions, Inc., 632 F.3d 377 (7th Cir. 2011) (divisibility of copyright rights and license theory)
I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 1996) (essence of an exclusive license is a promise not to grant the same permission to others)
Western Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1930) (exclusive licensee need not be sole licensee to have right to sue)