297 Ga. 70
Ga.2015Background
- Gary and Lynn Mims divorced in 2008; their settlement, incorporated into the decree, obligates husband to pay college costs for each child "for so long as the child . . . maintains passing grades and attends school full time."
- The youngest daughter enrolled at Valdosta State University (VSU) beginning Fall 2010 and attended through Fall 2013 with varying credit loads and some summer coursework.
- Wife filed a contempt action in 2012 alleging husband failed to pay the daughter's college expenses; parties stipulated the daughter maintained passing grades.
- Trial court found daughter attended college continuously during the normal school year from Fall 2010 through Fall 2013 and ordered husband to pay nine semesters of expenses, offset by Hope Scholarship and Pell Grants; the court did not hold husband in contempt for lack of prior notice of expenses.
- Husband appealed, arguing the agreement required the daughter to complete and receive credit for a full-time course load each semester (as opposed to merely "attending" full time), and that he should not be liable for semesters when she was part-time by VSU standards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wife) | Defendant's Argument (Husband) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether husband must pay college expenses after semesters where daughter withdrew from courses or had reduced credits | Wife: Agreement requires only that child "attend[] school full time" and maintain passing grades; daughter attended continuously during normal school years, so husband must pay | Husband: "Attends school full time" should mean completing and receiving credit for a full-time course load each semester; failure to do so terminates obligation | Court: "Attends school full time" means continuous attendance during the normal school year (per prior Georgia precedent); no requirement to complete a full credit load each semester; obligation continues when continuous attendance and passing grades met |
| Whether VSU's 12-credit definition of full-time controls | Wife: Parties did not incorporate VSU's definition; continuous attendance standard controls | Husband: School's definition should determine full-time status; part-time semesters should relieve him of obligation | Court: Parties did not adopt VSU's definition; court applied Georgia standard of continuous attendance, not VSU credit thresholds |
| Whether trial court could award expenses for semesters wife said she would not seek reimbursement for | Wife: Sought all college expenses in her petition, even if she later said she wouldn’t seek one semester | Husband: Wife’s admission that she wasn’t seeking Spring 2012 expenses should preclude award for that semester | Court: Wife’s hearing admission did not limit the court; petition and evidence supported awarding those expenses |
| Whether trial court improperly modified the decree rather than clarifying it | Husband: Trial court effectively modified the agreement by applying a different standard of "full time" attendance | Wife: Court was clarifying meaning consistent with parties' intent and Georgia caselaw | Court: Ruling was a reasonable clarification (not a modification) of the decree consistent with precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- Bullard v. Swafford, 279 Ga. 577 (Ga. 2005) (defined "full time student" as continuous attendance during the normal school year)
- Mattocks v. Matus, 266 Ga. 346 (Ga. 1996) (refused to use course load/credit hours where parties did not intend such a standard)
- Marshall v. Marshall, 262 Ga. 443 (Ga. 1992) (parental support beyond majority arises only by agreement)
- Hayward v. Lawrence, 252 Ga. 337 (Ga. 1984) (usage of "full time" construed in context of continuous attendance)
- Hopkinson v. Hopkinson, 265 Ga. 460 (Ga. 1995) (allowing offsets for scholarships/grants against parental college payment obligations)
- Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296 (Ga. 2006) (distinguishing clarification from impermissible modification of divorce decrees)
- Hamilton v. Hamilton, 292 Ga. 81 (Ga. 2012) (court may interpret or clarify decree but not modify it)
- Draughn v. Draughn, 288 Ga. 734 (Ga. 2011) (addressing limits where agreements are silent on summer attendance)