863 F.3d 636
7th Cir.2017Background
- Three Milwaukee police officers (Vidmar, Manney, Gomez) were discharged "for cause" by Police Chief Edward Flynn; pay and benefits ceased immediately. Each appealed to the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners; the Board affirmed the discharges (Gomez’s appeal was delayed but ultimately affirmed).
- The officers, joined by the Milwaukee Police Association (MPA), sued the City and Chief Flynn under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for procedural due process violations and sought unpaid wages under Wis. Stat. § 109.03.
- Central legal claim: Officers argued Wis. Stat. § 62.50(11) and (18) created a property interest in continued employment and pay between the chief’s discharge and the Board’s decision.
- District court granted judgment on the pleadings for the City, holding Wisconsin law does not protect a property interest in employment after a chief’s discharge and that § 62.50(18) applies only to suspension, not discharge.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed: the statute’s text, context, and legislative history show discharged officers lose employment immediately and are not entitled to pay while awaiting Board proceedings; MPA has associational standing through its members.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether discharged officers have a protected property interest in continued employment/pay pending Board appeal under Wis. Stat. § 62.50 | Officers: § 62.50(11) and the reference to trial mean discharge cannot be effective until a Board trial; thus employment and pay continue until Board decision | City: § 62.50 must be read in context; chief may discharge for cause and discharge takes effect immediately; § 62.50(18) grants pay only to suspended officers, not discharged ones | Held for City: No property interest after chief’s discharge; statutory text, structure, and legislative history show § 62.50(18) covers suspension only and discharged officers are not entitled to pay pending appeal |
| Whether MPA has standing to sue | MPA: asserts organizational interest in members’ due process and in knowing the law | City: MPA hasn’t alleged its own injury | Held: MPA lacks standalone injury but has associational standing because its members have standing and the suit’s purpose is germane to MPA |
| Whether plaintiffs were deprived of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment | Officers: loss of wages and employment pending appeal was a deprivation of property without due process | City: No protected property to be deprived after chief’s discharge; statutory appellate process satisfied due process | Held: No due process violation because there was no protected property interest after discharge |
| Whether plaintiffs are entitled to state-law wages under Wis. Stat. § 109.03 for the post-discharge/pre-Board period | Officers: owed wages because they remained employees until Board decision | City: Not employees after discharge; no wages owed | Held: No state-law wage award; plaintiffs were not employees during the periods alleged |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (standing principles)
- Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (standing requirements)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing doctrine)
- United States v. Kerner, 895 F.2d 1159 (financial injury as Article III injury)
- Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs of Milwaukee, 708 F.3d 921 (associational standing and MPA precedent)
- Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 843 F.3d 641 (Rule 12(c) de novo review standard)
- Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 271 Wis.2d 633 (statutory interpretation principles)
- Beischel v. Stone Bank Sch. Dist., 362 F.3d 430 (state law creating employment property interests)