Milton Ray Crawford v. State
10-14-00127-CR
| Tex. App. | Sep 24, 2015Background
- Milton Ray Crawford pled guilty in 1984 to sexual assault; later had two felony convictions for failing to register as a sex offender (the second in 2009).
- Crawford registered in 2009–2011 but ceased registering in 2012 after claiming he was not required to register; indicted in 2013 for third-degree felony failure-to-comply with registration, with two prior failures-to-register alleged as enhancements.
- At trial Crawford testified he believed registration did not apply to his 1984 conviction and relied on legal advice; he admitted failing to register in March 2012.
- Jury found him guilty; he pleaded true to the two prior convictions and the jury assessed an 85-year sentence after finding enhancement allegations true.
- Crawford appealed on five grounds: (1) illegal enhancement to habitual-offender range under Penal Code §12.42(d); (2) harmful jury charge on punishment range; (3) improper multiple uses (“quadruple duty”) of the 1984 conviction; (4) improper prosecutorial argument regarding parole; and (5) improper prosecutorial argument that he was a danger to children.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether Crawford’s 85-year sentence was illegal because punishment was improperly enhanced under Penal Code §12.42(d) | Crawford: Enhancement under general habitual-offender statute was improper; article 62.102(c) should govern enhancement | State: §12.42(b)/(d) may apply; article 62.102(c) is a special enhancement but does not preclude use of §12.42 when other prior felonies exist | Court: Rejected Crawford. §12.42 properly applied; sentence not illegal |
| 2. Whether jury was harmed by being charged on habitual-offender punishment range rather than next-higher felony under art. 62.102(c) | Crawford: Jury should have been instructed that enhancement is only to next-higher degree under art. 62.102(c) | State: Art. 62.102(c) would apply only if enhancement relied on prior failure-to-register convictions; Crawford had other felony priors so §12.42 applies | Court: No harm; enhancement to first-degree under §12.42(b) was proper |
| 3. Whether using the 1984 sexual-assault conviction to prove registration duty barred its use elsewhere (‘‘quadruple duty’’) | Crawford: The 1984 conviction was used to (a) establish duty to register and (b) to enhance punishment, which is impermissible | State: Ballard is distinguishable; here the 1984 conviction was not used as one of the two priors to trigger §12.42(d) enhancement | Court: Overruled; 1984 conviction was not impermissibly reused to enhance punishment |
| 4–5. Whether prosecutor’s punishment-phase arguments warranted mistrial (parole comment; danger-to-children comment) | Crawford: Prosecutor made improper and prejudicial statements warranting mistrial | State: Statements either proper response to evidence or harmless; trial court’s prompt instructions cured any error | Court: Overruled; any error was cured by prompt jury instructions and denial of mistrial was not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Ballard v. State, 149 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004) (prohibits using an underlying sexual-assault conviction as one of the two priors for habitual-offender enhancement in certain circumstances)
- Reyes v. State, 96 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002) (article 62.102(c) is a specific exception but does not preclude application of §12.42)
- Barker v. State, 335 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011) (rejects exclusivity of art. 62.102(c) and upholds use of §12.42 for enhancement)
- Ford v. State, 334 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. Crim. App.) (addresses nature of art. 62.102(c) as a punishment-enhancement provision)