Milton, MA v. FAA, 87 F.4th 91

The FAA implemented a satellite‑based navigation procedure at Boston Logan Airport that concentrated certain approach/departure flight paths over the Town of Milton, MA.
Milton, a primarily residential town ~10 miles from Logan, objected to increased aircraft noise and challenged the FAA’s environmental (NEPA) analysis supporting the procedure.
The FAA issued a final order authorizing the new procedure; Milton petitioned for judicial review claiming NEPA violations and noise harms to residents.
The FAA moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing, arguing Milton failed to show a cognizable injury to the municipality itself.
The First Circuit analyzed standing under TransUnion/Lujan/Spokeo principles: injury in fact must be concrete and particularized, and traceable/redressable.
The court dismissed Milton’s petition: harms alleged (resident noise impacts, reallocation of municipal resources, late‑raised claims about residents moving) do not show a legally cognizable municipal injury; a newly asserted theory was waived.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Milton can establish injury in fact by pointing to noise impacts on its residents	Milton: Residents suffer increased noise/annoyance; that constitutes injury affecting the Town	FAA: Harms to residents are not particularized injuries to the municipality; municipality cannot sue as parens patriae or by asserting residents' harms	Held: No — harms to residents alone are insufficient; municipality lacks standing on that theory
Whether municipal expenditures/time spent addressing complaints (resource diversion) constitute cognizable injury	Milton: Spent considerable time/money (coordination, monitors, advisory committee, lawyers) diverting municipal resources	FAA: Reallocating government resources to serve citizens is not an injury in fact; associational‑standing precedents do not apply to municipalities; attorneys’ fees are not an injury	Held: No — resource diversion to address constituent concerns is not a cognizable municipal injury here
Whether Milton’s late‑raised claim that residents sold homes causing fiscal/reputational harm can support standing	Milton (in reply): Residents sold homes/moved, causing fiscal and reputational harm to the Town	FAA: Argument was raised too late and lacks development; cannot be considered	Held: Waived — court declined to consider the new theory raised in the reply brief

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (U.S. 2021) (clarified standing elements; concreteness and particularization required)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (plaintiff bears burden to show injury in fact, causation, redressability)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (U.S. 2016) (concreteness and particularization are distinct standing requirements)
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (U.S. 1972) (party seeking review must itself be among the injured)
City of Olmsted Falls v. F.A.A., 292 F.3d 261 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (municipality may not sue on behalf of citizens as parens patriae; standing requires municipal injury)
City of N. Miami v. F.A.A., 47 F.4th 1257 (11th Cir. 2022) (municipal NEPA challenge dismissed for lack of standing where harms were to residents)
Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. F.A.A., 269 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2001) (case proceeded because non‑municipal petitioners had standing; municipal standing not resolved)
Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S. Ct. 1615 (U.S. 2020) (attorneys’ fees alone do not confer a concrete stake)
City of Los Angeles v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (municipal injury based on obligations under another statute — used to contrast NEPA‑only claims)