Millsap v. State, 2016 Ark. 391

In 1998 Lee Charles Millsap Jr. pleaded guilty to capital murder, terroristic threatening, and second-degree battery; he received life without parole plus concurrent six-year terms.
Millsap previously pursued postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 and sought coram nobis relief in 2010; those efforts were denied and prior appeals affirmed.
In September 2015 Millsap filed a second pro se writ of error coram nobis alleging (1) insanity at the time of trial, (2) a Brady violation by the prosecutor withholding evidence of his mental impairment, and (3) that his guilty plea was coerced.
The trial court denied the second coram-nobis petition; Millsap appealed and asked this Court for use of the record and an extension to file appellate materials.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas found that the record demonstrated Millsap could not prevail and therefore dismissed the appeal as well as rendering his procedural motion moot.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Millsap insane at time of trial such that coram-nobis relief is warranted?	Millsap argued the court-ordered competency exam (Dr. Doi) was invalid, IQ score unreliable (Flynn Effect), and new evidence shows insanity unknown at trial.	State argued competency was considered at trial, the evaluation and IQ were known to defense and court, and no extrinsic factual error was shown.	Denied — competence was considered at trial; no extrinsic fact unknown to court or defense was alleged.
Did prosecutor violate Brady by withholding evidence of Millsap’s mental impairments?	Millsap alleged the prosecutor suppressed facts (military service, family deaths, accident history) and nolle prossed an unrelated rape charge due to mental incapacity.	State argued those life events were known to Millsap and defense and no proof was offered that the prosecutor possessed undisclosed material evidence affecting guilt or competence.	Denied — no showing material favorable evidence was suppressed or unavailable to defense pre-plea.
Was Millsap’s guilty plea coerced?	Millsap contended counsel forced a plea (no defense theory) and prosecutor threatened death penalty, coercing the plea.	State argued allegations reflect ineffective assistance (not a coram-nobis ground) and that mere fear of harsher sentence is not coercion.	Denied — allegations amounted to ineffective-assistance claims or general plea pressure, not coram-nobis cognizable coercion.

Newman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 61 (2009) (defines coram-nobis writ’s purpose and standards)
Howard v. State, 403 S.W.3d 38 (2012) (coram-nobis is an extraordinary remedy; presumption of conviction validity)
Millsap v. State, 449 S.W.3d 701 (2014) (prior appeal discussing insanity and ineffective-assistance claims)
Wheeler v. State, 463 S.W.3d 678 (2015) (appeal may be dismissed when record shows appellant cannot prevail)
Westerman v. State, 456 S.W.3d 374 (2015) (competence considered by sentencing court precludes coram-nobis based on the same facts)