Mills v. Iowa, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1016

Mills, the University of Iowa’s General Counsel, accepted a 2005 offer with at-will status and a five-year initial term was added in a 2005 revised letter; contingencies included Board approval and background checks.
In Oct. 2007 a female student athlete was sexually assaulted by two football players; Athletics led the initial inquiry and communications flowed through Mills and University leadership.
The Board and Advisory Committee retained Stolar in July 2008 to investigate the University’s handling of the incident; Stolar issued its report on Sept. 18, 2008.
Mills was terminated in Sept. 2008 following Stolar’s findings; the termination was communicated by Mason and True, with subsequent public articles; the University later disclosed Stolar’s report publicly via the Board’s channels.
Mills pursued claims for defamation, false light, due process, and interference with contract; the court granted summary judgment against Mills on several counts and granted qualified privilege defenses.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Defamation elements against Stolar and Bryant	Mills alleges false statements of fact and malice in Stolar’s report and Bryant’s media comments.	Statements were opinions or not false; no malice shown; privilege may apply.	Defendants entitled to summary judgment on defamation.
False light invasion of privacy viability	Statements published in Stolar report and Bryant’s remarks place Mills in a false, highly offensive light.	Requires actual malice and falsity; no genuine malice shown.	Qualified privilege and lack of malice defeat false light claims.
Qualified privilege applicability to defamation/false light	Stolar/Bryant acted outside protected scope or with malice.	Statements made in good faith within a proper scope for Board/Advisory Committee; publication proper.	Defendants protected by qualified privilege; no abuse proven.
Interference with Mills’ employment	Stolar/Bryant caused Mills’ termination by improper interference.	At-will employee; no improper intent; no causation shown.	No genuine issue; Mills cannot sustain interference claim.
Count VI due process/name-clearing			Court determines Count VI abandoned; grant of summary judgment accordingly.

Vinson v. Linn-Mar Cmty. Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1984) (defamation analysis and per se standards)
Fey v. King, 194 Iowa 835 (Iowa 1922) (defamatory standards; per se criteria)
Jones v. Palmer Commc’ns, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884 (Iowa 1989) (defamation opinions vs. provable facts)
Vojak v. Jensen, 161 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa 1968) (defamation privilege and malice reference)
Barreca v. Nickolas, 683 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 2004) (qualified privilege; abuse requires actual malice)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (actual malice standard for public officials)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (dispositive standard for summary judgment and material facts)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (burden shifting on summary judgment)
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (reckless disregard standard for actual malice)