Milliman v. Colvin
1:16-cv-01279
D. Del.Sep 7, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Barry R. Milliman (born 1952) applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (DIB) on December 26, 2013, alleging disabling coronary artery disease, brittle diabetes, reflex sympathetic dystrophy (left foot), asthma, and related conditions; application was denied at initial and reconsideration levels and an ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on June 24, 2016.
- treating providers (Drs. Feiner, Molloy, Reinkraut, Colletti) completed impairment questionnaires limiting sitting, standing, walking, lifting, concentration, and predicting frequent absences; treating records often contained largely normal exam findings.
- State agency reviewers found ability to perform at most light-to-sedentary exertion (lift 25/10 lbs, sit 6 hrs, stand/walk 4 hrs); ALJ adopted a sedentary RFC with specified postural and environmental limits.
- At hearing plaintiff testified to chest pain, shortness of breath, neuropathic foot pain, limited sitting (≈30 min) and standing (≈20 min), caregiving duties for ill wife; a vocational expert testified that with the ALJ’s RFC transferable sedentary jobs exist but frequent extra breaks or 2–3 absences/month would preclude employment.
- ALJ gave little or no weight to most treating questionnaire opinions (lack of objective support, inconsistency with treating notes, some opinions outside provider’s specialization), gave significant weight to the endocrinologist (Dr. Magnotti) and some weight to state agency reviewers, found plaintiff’s subjective symptom claims only partially credible, and concluded plaintiff was not disabled through the decision date.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ properly weighed treating physicians' opinions | Treating doctors’ opinions deserved controlling or greater weight under the treating-physician rule; ALJ failed to apply required factors and erred in rejecting them | ALJ permissibly found treating opinions unsupported or inconsistent with the record, applied regulatory factors and gave reasons for weight assigned | ALJ did not err: substantial evidence supports assigning little/no weight to those opinions due to lack of objective support, inconsistency, or being outside the provider’s expertise |
| Whether ALJ fairly assessed plaintiff's credibility/symptom testimony | ALJ improperly discredited plaintiff despite work history and medical support; ALJ ignored evidence (e.g., prior workplace restrictions) | ALJ reasonably found claimant’s reported intensity/limitations inconsistent with medical records and activities of daily living; provided specific, record-based reasons | ALJ’s credibility determination upheld as supported by substantial evidence (normal exams, activities, circumstances of job loss) |
| Whether RFC is supported by substantial evidence | RFC underestimates functional limitations asserted by treating sources and plaintiff (e.g., sitting/standing limits, need for extra breaks/absences) | RFC reflects a conservative reading of the record, incorporates limitations supported by objective evidence and state-agency opinions, and rejects unsupported extreme limitations | RFC affirmed: supported by substantial evidence and consistent with ALJ’s evaluation of opinions and testimony; vocational testimony shows sedentary jobs available under that RFC |
| Whether remand is required for further development of the record | Remand needed because ALJ failed to resolve conflicts and gave insufficient reasons for discounting treating opinions | No remand necessary; ALJ adequately explained reasoning and record is complete for decision | No remand: court recommends granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff’s motion |
Key Cases Cited
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (summary-judgment standard and evidentiary review principles)
- Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2005) (definition of substantial evidence in Social Security review)
- Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185 (3d Cir. 1986) (court’s limited scope in reviewing administrative factfinding)
- Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 1999) (ALJ’s duties in assessing medical opinions and RFC)
- Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2000) (treating physician rule; weight given to treating source)
- Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981) (requirement to explain rejection of probative evidence)
- Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1984) (consideration of long work history in credibility assessment)
- Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (reviewing court must judge administrative action by the grounds invoked by the agency)
- Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003) (definition and statutory framework for disability)
- Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990) (standards for disability determination under the Act)
- Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34 (3d Cir. 2001) (treating physician standard and treating-source deference)