Miller v. Oregon Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 642 F.3d 711

Douglas Miller was convicted of aggravated murder in 1982 for hiring a man to kill his wife, and received an indeterminate life sentence with a 30-year minimum term during which he was not parole-eligible.
After about 20 years, Miller became eligible for a murder-review hearing under Oregon law to determine if he is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period, which could convert his sentence to life with parole eligibility if proven.
Oregon Revised Statutes § 163.105(3)-(4) govern early eligibility for the murder-review hearing and require Miller to prove rehabilitation by a preponderance of the evidence; if not met, the board must deny relief.
Miller submitted extensive materials to the Board for the murder-review hearing, including admissions, psychological reports, letters of responsibility, and letters of support; the Board denied early eligibility without elaboration.
Administrative review affirmed the Board’s denial; Miller appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals and then the Oregon Supreme Court, which denied review.
Miller then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging a due process violation for lack of substantial evidence supporting the Board’s decision; the district court denied relief, and the Ninth Circuit later addressed intervening changes in caselaw.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Oregon’s murder-review statute create a liberty interest in early eligibility for parole?	Miller argues statute creates a protected liberty interest by mandating early eligibility upon rehabilitation showing.	Board contends no liberty interest; it merely requires a burden on the prisoner and denial if not met.	Yes; statute creates protected liberty interest in early eligibility.
What due process standard governs Board decisions on early eligibility after Hayward and Pearson?	Miller relies on some-evidence as the constitutional standard.	State law defines the quantum of evidence; due process requires substantial evidence under state review where applicable.	Due process requires substantial evidence under Oregon law; not a universal some-evidence standard.
Was the Board's denial of early eligibility supported by substantial evidence under Oregon law?	Board’s findings lack sufficient evidence to deny rehabilitation.	Record contains factors (crime’s callousness, remorse concerns) that support denial.	Yes; the record supports denial by substantial evidence.
Did Miller receive due process in light of the intervening Hayward-Pearson framework?	Hayward required some federal standard for parole evidence.	State law determines standard; Hayward and Pearson permit state-defined substantial evidence review.	upheld under state-law substantial-evidence review; no constitutional violation.

Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc: state law creates liberty interest in parole; standard depends on state law)
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (parole statute creates expectancy of release with constitutional protections)
Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) (parole statutes with mandatory language create liberty interest)
McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (parole statute with mandatory release language creates liberty interest)
Pearson v. Muntz, 625 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 2010) (Hayward clarified variability of federal due-process standard based on state law)
Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirmative review authority to uphold Board decisions under substantial-evidence framework)