Miller v. Mellot, 2019 Ohio 4084

Background

Plaintiffs (Miller et al.) sought a declaratory judgment under the Marketable Title Act (MTA) that they owned fee simple title including minerals based on a 1959 deed containing the clause “except all the oil and gas in and under said real estate.”
The chain of title in the record showed a 1947 purported severance deed and the 1959 purported root deed, but there was a gap — no deeds between 1947 and 1959 were in the record.
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ MTA claim; this court affirmed but relied on grounds not addressed below, prompting Plaintiffs to file an application for reconsideration and a motion to certify a conflict with other appellate decisions.
Plaintiffs argued Blackstone’s three-step test required treating the 1959 clause as a mere repetition (a prior-deed reference) and thus not specific enough to preserve the mineral interest under R.C. 5301.49.
The panel granted reconsideration to clarify its reasoning: because the record contained a void in the post-severance/pre-root deed history, the court could not conclude the 1959 clause was a repetition; it therefore treated the 1959 deed as containing an original exception and not conveying a fee simple free of mineral reservation.
The court denied the motion to certify a conflict, finding the other cited cases had complete post-severance/pre-root histories (a factual distinction), so no rule-of-law conflict existed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 1959 root deed’s “except all the oil and gas” language is a prior-deed reference so Blackstone’s three-step test applies	The clause repeats the 1947 severance and is therefore a general reference insufficient to preserve the mineral interest under Blackstone	The record lacks intervening deeds, so the court cannot treat the 1959 clause as a repetition; it must be treated as an original exception	Because of the void in the post-severance/pre-root deed history, the court could not determine the clause was a prior-deed reference and treated it as an original exception; the 1959 deed did not convey a fee simple free of the reservation
Whether this court’s Miller decision conflicts with Blackstone and other appellate decisions	Miller conflicts with other districts and Blackstone by focusing on repetition rather than Blackstone’s specificity test	Miller is factually distinguishable because other cases had complete deed histories; Miller involved a gap in the record preventing application of Blackstone	No conflict: Miller was distinguished on factual grounds (incomplete deed history), so Blackstone and other cases remain good law where the record permits the three-step inquiry
Whether reconsideration or certification was procedurally appropriate	Reconsideration and certification are warranted to correct alleged error and to present an inter-district conflict	Reconsideration is appropriate only for obvious errors; certification requires a rule-of-law conflict on the same question and dispositive issue	Court granted reconsideration to clarify its holding but denied certification because the factual record distinguished Miller from the other decisions and no rule-of-law conflict existed

Key Cases Cited

Blackstone v. Moore, 122 N.E.3d 132 (Ohio 2018) (announced the three-step R.C. 5301.49 inquiry to decide whether a root-of-title reference preserves a prior interest)
Whitelock v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 613 N.E.2d 1032 (Ohio 1993) (sets standards for certifying conflicts among appellate districts)
State ex rel. Davet v. Sutula, 963 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio 2012) (motion to certify must present an issue dispositive of the case)
Matthews v. Matthews, 450 N.E.2d 278 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (standard for reconsideration: correct obvious error or raise an issue not previously considered)
State v. Owens, 678 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (reconsideration is not for mere disagreement with the court’s reasoning)