Miller v. Hoefer, 344 P.3d 121

Petitioner sought a permanent stalking protective order (SPO) under ORS 30.866 after a short relationship ended in January 2013.
Respondent created fake social-media aliases, emailed and messaged several of petitioner’s friends, and confronted petitioner at a nightclub, calling her derogatory names and following her as she left.
Respondent returned and then removed petitioner’s property (a fire pit and other items), later leaving them at the edge of her driveway; petitioner viewed those acts and the contacts with friends as unwelcome and alarming.
Petitioner obtained an ex parte temporary SPO and later sought a permanent SPO; at the contested hearing she testified she was afraid for her and her children’s safety and referenced respondent’s alleged prior felony history without detailed proof.
The trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was repeated and unwanted contact, some non‑speech contact, and that an objectively reasonable person would be alarmed; the court entered a permanent SPO.
On appeal, the court reviewed whether petitioner proved (1) qualifying repeated and unwanted contact (speech must be a threat), (2) subjective and objectively reasonable alarm or apprehension about personal safety, and (3) respondent’s mental state.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether respondent’s speech (club comments and emails) qualified as "contacts" under ORS 30.866 given Article I, §8 threat requirement	Petitioner argued those communications, with other conduct, were part of repeated unwanted contacts that made her fearful	Respondent argued the speech was non‑threatening (anger/hyperbole) and thus cannot be predicate contact	Held for respondent: speech did not constitute a threat; it was rhetorical anger/hyperbole and not qualifying contact
Whether petitioner proved objectively reasonable apprehension for personal safety (self or children) from respondent’s non‑speech contacts (following, confronting, taking/returning property, contacting friends)	Petitioner argued cumulative contacts, references to her children, and alleged past violent felony history made her fear for personal safety	Respondent conceded contacts were unwanted but argued petitioner failed to show how they caused objectively reasonable fear of personal safety	Held for respondent: petitioner did not tie fear to specific anticipated harm or provide evidence making apprehension objectively reasonable; reversal of SPO granted

Travis v. Strubel, 238 Or. App. 254 (standard of review and presumption about implicit findings)
Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485 (presumption about implicit findings)
Ragsdale v. Fleming, 265 Or. App. 342 (burden to prove SPO elements by a preponderance)
Braude v. Braude, 250 Or. App. 122 (elements required for an SPO)
Jennings v. Gifford, 211 Or. App. 192 (speech qualifies only if it is a threat under Article I, §8)
Huber v. Landolt, 267 Or. App. 753 (objective‑reasonableness requires tying fear to anticipated harm)
Miley v. Miley, 264 Or. App. 719 (reversing SPO where appellant had no history of violence despite insulting contacts)
Tesema v. Belete, 266 Or. App. 650 (distinguishing remote/isolated past violence from recent pervasive violence for objective reasonableness)