419 P.3d 392
Or.2018Background
- Oregon resident Miller's 2001 Ford Escape (manufactured in Missouri, first sold Sept. 2001) allegedly caused a 2012 fire that damaged her home and injured her.
- Miller sued Ford in Oregon in April 2014 for product defects and failure to warn; Ford removed to federal court and moved for summary judgment.
- Ford argued ORS 30.905(2) bars Miller because Oregon's 10-year product-repose runs from first purchase; Miller argued ORS 30.905(2)(b) looks to the state of manufacture and Missouri had no repose statute.
- The district court denied summary judgment, holding that if the manufacturing state has no repose statute, Oregon's statute of repose does not apply; Ford appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit certified the legal question to the Oregon Supreme Court: whether ORS 30.905(2) imposes any repose when the manufacturing state has no statute of repose.
- The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed text, legislative history (2009 S.B. 284), and constitutional arguments and resolved the certified question in Miller’s favor.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ORS 30.905(2) bars an Oregon product-liability action when the manufacturing state has no statute of repose | Miller: If the manufacturing state has no repose statute, no repose applies in Oregon; plaintiff can use the manufacturing state's timetable (i.e., none). | Ford: Text and context require Oregon's 10-year repose to apply when the manufacturing state has no statute; absence of a "statute" cannot supply an "expiration." | Court: If the manufacturing state has no statute of repose for an equivalent action, then Oregon law imposes no statute of repose under ORS 30.905(2). |
| Proper interpretation of ORS 30.905(2)(b) — choice-of-law or delegation | Miller: Provision lets plaintiffs use the repose period (or lack thereof) of the manufacturing state when suing in Oregon. | Ford: Provision could unlawfully delegate legislative power to other states or create constitutional issues if it imports foreign law dynamically. | Court: ORS 30.905(2)(b) functions as a choice-of-law rule, not an unconstitutional delegation; it does not convert foreign law into Oregon law. |
| Whether legislative history supports applying no repose when manufacturing state lacks one | Miller: Legislative record (S.B. 284 debates) shows intent to let Oregonians sue at home and use the manufacturing state's repose or lack thereof. | Ford: Legislature could not have intended potentially limitless exposure for Oregon defendants. | Court: Legislative history confirms the legislature intended plaintiffs to benefit from the later timeframe, including where the manufacturing state had no repose statute. |
| Whether applying ORS 30.905(2)(b) prospectively violates Article I, §21 (impermissible delegation) | Miller: No; statute does not delegate lawmaking — it chooses which foreign repose applies. | Ford: Using another state's repose (including changes after 2009) impermissibly lets foreign law determine Oregon law. | Court: No violation — statute is a permissible choice-of-law mechanism and does not delegate lawmaking to other states. |
Key Cases Cited
- Shasta View Irrigation Dist. v. Amoco Chemicals, 329 Or. 151 (1999) (distinguishes statute of limitations from statute of repose; discovery rule applies to limitations)
- Gaines v. State, 346 Or. 160 (2009) (statutory interpretation principles; review of text and legislative history)
- Erickson Air-Crane Co. v. United Tech. Corp., 303 Or. 281 (1987) (history and purpose of ORS 30.905; legislative intent to limit manufacturer exposure)
- Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307 (1966) (led to legislative responses creating repose rules and discovery-rule adjustments)
- DeLay v. Marathon LeTourneau Sales, 291 Or. 310 (1981) (background on Oregon statutes of repose origin)
- Josephs v. Burns & Bear, 260 Or. 493 (1970) (legislative intent to create maximum time limits regardless of discovery)
- Van Winkle v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 151 Or. 455 (1935) (constitutional rule against unlawful delegation of legislative power)
- Seale v. McKennon, 215 Or. 562 (1959) (permissible incorporation of other bodies' laws under limits)
- Osborn v. PSRB, 325 Or. 135 (1997) (limits on adopting a "current" external standard)
- Cash Flow Investors, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 318 Or. 88 (1993) (court's discretion to restate or clarify certified questions)