2022 IL App (4th) 210204
Ill. App. Ct.2022Background
- Miller delivered grain to SGI under a preprinted "price later" arrangement (Price Later Contract 215) with deliveries between Sept. 25, 2015 and Jan. 26, 2016; the form was fully executed on March 15, 2016 and assigned pricing to July 2016 CBOT futures with seller selecting the month price.
- SGI sent a purchase confirmation May 18, 2016; Miller signed it June 6, 2016.
- SGI was declared to have failed on November 1, 2016; Miller filed a claim to the Illinois Grain Insurance Fund on November 22, 2016. Under the Grain Code, price-later claims receive protection only if priced or delivered within 160 days before the dealer failure (i.e., on or after May 25, 2016).
- The Department’s Bureau denied the claim, asserting 240 ILCS 40/10-15(e) priced the grain automatically 30 days after last delivery (Feb. 26, 2016), placing the claim outside the 160-day window.
- An ALJ concluded pricing occurred later (either June 6, 2016 when Miller signed the confirmation, or May 28, 2016 under UCC confirmation rules) and awarded compensation; the Department’s director reversed, the circuit court affirmed the director, and the appellate court reversed the director and affirmed the ALJ.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 240 ILCS 40/10-15(e) causes automatic pricing 30 days after last delivery if no price-later contract is signed | "Shall be priced" requires an actor (the dealer) to set the price; pricing did not occur automatically and was set June 6, 2016 (or May 28, 2016 under UCC) | The statutory text mandates that the grain "shall be priced" on the next business day after 30 days; the statute does not name an actor, so pricing occurs as a matter of law on that date | Court: "shall be priced" is not an automatic-pricing rule; read in context of dealer duties (and required notice), the dealer must set the price and notify the seller; ALJ's later-pricing determination stands |
| Whether the Department’s contrary statutory interpretation is entitled to deference | Agency misread the unambiguous statute | Agency interpretation merits deference absent error or unreasonableness | Court declined deference because the Department’s interpretation conflicted with the statute’s plain meaning |
Key Cases Cited
- Marsh v. Sandstone North, LLC, 179 N.E.3d 402 (IL App. 2020) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Vance v. Joyner, 146 N.E.3d 285 (IL App. 2019) (statutory language is primary indicator of legislative intent)
- Van Dyke v. White, 131 N.E.3d 511 (Ill. 2019) (no part of a statute should be rendered meaningless)
- Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 669 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1996) (discussion of statutory phrasing and effect of mandatory limits on awards)
- Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010) (discussion of statutory interpretation principles)