123 F. Supp. 3d 924
E.D. Ky.2015Background
- After Obergefell (2015), Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis (an Apostolic Christian) announced her office would not issue any marriage licenses rather than issue licenses to same-sex couples.
- Plaintiffs are same-sex and opposite-sex Rowan County residents who were denied marriage licenses in their home county and seek a preliminary injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Davis in her official capacity.
- Neighboring counties were issuing licenses; plaintiffs could travel but preferred (and some residents may be unable) to obtain licenses in Rowan County.
- Governor Beshear issued a directive instructing county clerks to issue gender-neutral marriage-license forms consistent with Obergefell; Davis refused to follow that directive on religious grounds.
- The court held preliminary-injunction hearings and analyzed the claim under the four-factor preliminary-injunction standard (likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of harms, public interest).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Davis's refusal to issue any licenses substantially interferes with the fundamental right to marry | Davis's policy forecloses obtaining a license in plaintiffs' home county and significantly discourages marriage | Plaintiffs can obtain licenses in neighboring counties or from the judge executive; no total bar | Court: Policy substantially interferes with the right to marry for Rowan County residents; heightened scrutiny applies and plaintiffs likely to succeed on merits |
| Whether the state interest (protecting Davis's religious freedom) is compelling | State must accommodate Davis's free exercise; compelling interest does not exist to force her | State interest is enforcing Obergefell, upholding the rule of law, preventing discrimination and Establishment Clause issues | Court: State interests in applying Obergefell and maintaining rule of law are compelling/legitimate; Davis's objection does not justify her policy |
| Whether Governor Beshear's directive is subject to strict scrutiny under Free Exercise or is a neutral, generally applicable rule | Beshear's directive burdens Davis's religious exercise and should trigger strict scrutiny; RFRA/KRFA protections apply | Directive is neutral and generally applicable; applies to all clerks to implement Supreme Court decision; rational-basis review governs state action | Court: Directive is neutral/generally applicable and rationally related to legitimate interests; Davis unlikely to prevail on free-exercise claim under Smith/Kentucky analysis |
| Whether issuing licenses constitutes compelled speech or violates Davis's Free Speech rights | Issuing licenses compels Davis to endorse or express approval of same-sex marriage | Issuing statutorily prescribed forms is government action/administrative function, not protected personal speech; as a public employee Davis's speech is limited | Court: Davis's act is tied to official duties and is not protected employee speech; compelled-speech claim unlikely to succeed |
| Whether plaintiffs may obtain injunctive relief against Davis in her official capacity given state-sovereign immunity and policymaker issues | Plaintiffs seek prospective relief against Davis as state actor under Ex parte Young | Davis argues she is not a final policymaker for the county and Eleventh Amendment concerns | Court: Ex parte Young permits prospective relief; Davis likely acts under state law in issuing licenses and injunction against her official capacity is appropriate |
| Whether preliminary-injunction factors favor relief | Plaintiffs: Likelihood of success on merits, irreparable harm (constitutional injury), public interest favors injunction | Davis: Harms to her religious exercise and speech, alternative options exist for plaintiffs | Court: All four factors weigh for plaintiffs; preliminary injunction granted prohibiting Davis from applying her no-license policy to plaintiffs |
Key Cases Cited
- Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing freedom to marry as a fundamental right)
- Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (state actions that substantially interfere with right to marry trigger heightened scrutiny)
- Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires a policy or custom causing the constitutional deprivation)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (federal courts may enjoin state officials prospectively to prevent ongoing violations of federal law)
- Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (laws neutral and generally applicable need not satisfy strict scrutiny for Free Exercise challenges)
- Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (laws targeting religiously motivated conduct are not neutral and trigger strict scrutiny)
- City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidated RFRA as applied to the states)
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (speech pursuant to public employment duties is not protected for First Amendment purposes)
- Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (First Amendment includes the right not to speak)
- Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (balancing test for public-employee speech)