Miller, Arthur Franklin Jr.
548 S.W.3d 497
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2018Background
- Miller (defendant) waived a jury and proceeded to a bench trial on charges of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child; the trial judge convicted and sentenced him to 22 and 10 years imprisonment respectively.
- At trial and punishment the parties argued as if the judge could consider probation; later it was established that under the law in effect for offenses in 2001 only a jury could recommend probation.
- Trial counsel allegedly misadvised Miller that the judge could grant probation; Miller claimed he would have chosen a jury trial if correctly advised and filed a motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance.
- The State conceded counsel’s performance was deficient (Strickland prong one), so the sole disputed issue became whether Miller proved prejudice (Strickland prong two).
- The trial court denied the new-trial motion; the court of appeals affirmed, holding Miller failed to show a reasonable probability a jury would have granted probation.
- On discretionary review the plurality applied the ordinary Strickland prejudice inquiry for cases with an entire trial; the majority later remanded to consider whether prejudice should focus solely on Miller’s jury-waiver decision in light of Lee v. United States, prompting this dissent which argues against expanding Hill-type waiver analysis to cases where a full trial occurred.
Issues
| Issue | Miller's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller proved Strickland prejudice from counsel’s advice that the judge could grant probation | Miller: prejudice shown because, but for bad advice, he would have insisted on a jury trial (and a jury could have granted probation) | State: prejudice must be shown as a reasonable probability that the outcome (sentence) would differ; record shows a jury likely would not have granted probation | Dissent: apply ordinary Strickland outcome-focused prejudice (not waiver-only); Miller did not show reasonable probability of a better result, so no relief |
| Applicable prejudice standard when counsel’s error concerned probation eligibility but a full trial occurred | Miller: focus on defendant’s decision to waive jury (Hill-style) | State: apply Strickland trial-outcome standard because an entire trial occurred | Dissent: confines case to trial-outcome Strickland standard; Hill/Lee are for forfeited proceedings only |
| Whether Lee v. United States requires analyzing only the defendant’s decision to waive trial when trial actually occurred | Miller: majority reads Lee as supporting waiver-focused inquiry | State: Lee applies to cases where entire proceeding was waived; not here | Dissent: Lee is inapplicable—Miller had a full trial, so Lee does not change the prejudice analysis |
| Remedy scope if prejudice proven | Miller: new trial (implicit full retrial) | State: at most relief limited to punishment phase because guilt phase had a full evidentiary trial | Dissent: if any relief warranted it should be limited to punishment; but no prejudice shown so affirm |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing two-prong ineffective-assistance test and outcome-focused prejudice in trials)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (prejudice in guilty-plea context focuses on whether defendant would have gone to trial)
- Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (prejudice inquiry when counsel fails to file an appeal addresses lost proceeding rather than trial-outcome reliability)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (when ineffective advice affects plea decisions after a trial offer, prejudice requires showing the plea would have produced a more favorable outcome)
- Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (clarifies Hill-type prejudice focus for cases where an entire judicial proceeding was forfeited; Court of Appeals’ majority reliance on Lee is disputed in this dissent)