Miller, Arthur Franklin Jr., PD-0891-15

Appellant Arthur Miller was indicted for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child; he waived a jury, pleaded not guilty, and after a bench trial was convicted and sentenced (22 years).
Trial counsel advised Miller that a bench trial could result in probation (community supervision); that advice was incorrect because, as a matter of law for these offenses, the trial judge could not grant probation at the time of the alleged offenses.
The State conceded at appellate stages that trial counsel’s advice about probation eligibility fell below professional norms (Strickland performance prong).
Miller filed a motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance based on erroneous advice that induced him to waive his absolute right to a jury; the trial court denied the motion after a hearing with live testimony.
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding Miller failed to prove the Strickland prejudice prong — i.e., no reasonable probability the result would have been different if counsel had given correct advice.
Miller sought discretionary review, arguing (among other points) that unlike in Riley or Recer, his waiver was not a tactical choice and the record shows a reasonable probability a jury would have acquitted or sentenced him to probation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Miller)	Defendant's Argument (State / Trial Court)	Held
Whether counsel’s erroneous advice about probation eligibility that induced a jury waiver satisfied Strickland prejudice prong	Miller: He relied on counsel’s incorrect promise of probation and would not have waived a jury; a jury could have acquitted or imposed probation, so there is reasonable probability of a different outcome	State/Trial Court: Counsel’s performance was deficient but Miller failed to show a substantial likelihood the result would have been different; trial judge credited witness assessments and found no reasonable probability of a different outcome	Court of Appeals: Affirmed — conceded deficiency but held Miller did not meet Strickland prejudice prong; denial of new trial affirmed

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance test: performance and prejudice)
Riley v. State, 378 S.W.3d 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (deferential review of trial court, requirements for proving prejudice when counsel misadvises on probation and jury-waiver issues)
State v. Recer, 815 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (framework for proving different-result prejudice when counsel misinforms about probation eligibility)
Ex parte Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (defendant’s reliance on incorrect legal advice can vitiate voluntariness of rights waiver)
Anthony v. State, 457 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2015) (grant of PDR noted; persuasive authority addressing jury-waiver induced by false promise of community supervision)