Millea v. Erickson
2014 SD 34
| S.D. | 2014Background
- Ten‑month‑old Kimimila (Kimi) was being babysat by Jolyn Erickson at the apartment where Kelly Laughlin (property owner’s son) was visiting; Erickson had primary responsibility and had babysat the family before.
- Laughlin suggested putting Kimi in her car seat and in a bedroom to nap; Erickson placed the child in the car seat, buckled the top strap, and set the car seat in a bedroom with the door mostly closed.
- Laughlin left the apartment before 5:00 P.M.; while Erickson was briefly in a bathroom she heard a noise, found the car seat tipped forward, and Kimi lifeless; the bottom buckle was unlatched and Kimi died of positional asphyxiation.
- The estate sued both Erickson and Laughlin for negligence; default judgment was entered against Erickson; Laughlin moved for summary judgment arguing he owed no legal duty to Kimi.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment for Laughlin; the estate appealed, arguing Laughlin’s suggestions and familial‑like influence created an assumed or concurrent duty.
- The Supreme Court affirmed, holding Laughlin had no legal duty to Kimi as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Laughlin owed a statutory duty under SDCL 20‑9‑1 | SDCL 20‑9‑1 codifies negligence and imposes responsibility for injuries, so Laughlin had a duty to exercise ordinary care toward Kimi | SDCL 20‑9‑1 is a codification of common‑law negligence and does not by itself create duty in these circumstances | SDCL 20‑9‑1 does not, by itself, impose the alleged duty on Laughlin |
| Whether a special relationship (Restatement §314A(4)) existed | Laughlin’s age and quasi‑familial role gave him influence over Erickson so he took custody/control, creating a special relationship and duty | Laughlin only made suggestions; Erickson retained control and never relinquished responsibility for Kimi | No special relationship existed; Laughlin did not have custody or control that would create a duty |
| Whether Laughlin gratuitously undertook a duty (Restatement §§323, 324) | By intervening and directing placement of Kimi, Laughlin undertook care and thus owed reasonable care; his actions increased risk or induced reliance | There was no express or implied undertaking; Erickson remained in charge and did not rely on Laughlin to assume responsibility | No gratuitous duty was assumed: undisputed facts show Erickson retained supervision and Laughlin did not take charge |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate | Estate argued unresolved factual issue about influence/assumption of care | Laughlin argued absence of any legal duty as a matter of law | Summary judgment affirmed; no legal duty existed as a matter of law |
Key Cases Cited
- Andrushchenko v. Silchuk, 744 N.W.2d 850 (S.D. 2008) (summary judgment proper where plaintiffs failed to show defendant undertook supervision of child)
- Erickson v. Lavielle, 368 N.W.2d 624 (S.D. 1985) (no general duty to rescue; undertaking to assist creates duty of reasonable care)
- Wildeboer v. S.D. Junior Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 561 N.W.2d 666 (S.D. 1997) (SDCL 20‑9‑1 is codification of common law negligence)
- Poelstra v. Basin Elec. Power Co‑op., 545 N.W.2d 823 (S.D. 1996) (statute recognizes negligence rights but does not define when duty arises)
- First Am. Bank & Trust v. Farmers State Bank of Canton, 756 N.W.2d 19 (S.D. 2008) (existence of duty is question of law; summary judgment appropriate if no duty)
- Thompson v. Summers, 567 N.W.2d 387 (S.D. 1997) (citing SDCL 20‑9‑1 as codification of common‑law negligence)