Mill Creek Metro. Dist. Bd. of Commrs. v. Less
2022 Ohio 1289
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2022Background
- Mill Creek MetroParks Board (Park District) filed two eminent-domain petitions (against Green Valley and Diane Less) to acquire easements for a 6.4-mile extension (Phase III) of an existing bikeway/recreational trail along an abandoned rail corridor. The Park District relied on a 1993 resolution and a 2018 resolution declaring the bikeway necessary.
- Park District asserted authority to appropriate under R.C. 1545.11 (park boards may acquire lands “for conversion into forest reserves and for the conservation of the natural resources of the state”) and followed Chapter 163 procedures.
- Less (and Green Valley) moved for judgment on the pleadings and later for summary judgment, arguing R.C. 1545.11 does not authorize takings merely to build a bikeway and that the Park District’s notices/resolutions were deficient.
- Trial courts denied the motions, concluding the resolutions created a rebuttable presumption of necessity and were authorized by R.C. 1545.11 (citing State ex rel. Coles).
- The Seventh District majority reversed: it held the Park District’s resolutions failed to state a statutory purpose tied to conservation of natural resources, so the agency abused its discretion and summary judgment for Less (and Green Valley) must be entered. A dissent argued the orders were not final/appealable and the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Park District) | Defendant's Argument (Less/Green Valley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Statutory scope: Does R.C. 1545.11 authorize appropriation to create a bikeway/recreational trail? | R.C. 1545.11 authorizes park boards to appropriate for parks/parkways and prior authority (Coles and other cases) supports trails/bikeways as within conservation/park powers. | R.C. 1545.11 is limited to conversion into forest reserves and conservation of natural resources; a bikeway for recreation/transportation is not that purpose. | Held for defendant: court concluded the statute requires a covered conservation purpose; the Park District’s resolutions lacked language tying the takings to conservation of natural resources. |
| 2) Sufficiency of resolutions / necessity determination (presumption under R.C. 163.09) | The board’s resolutions declaring necessity create a rebuttable presumption of necessity; owners must show abuse of discretion to overcome it. | The resolutions did not assert a statutory, conservation-based purpose and thus the board abused its discretion in making the necessity determination. | Held for defendant: court found an abuse of discretion because resolutions lacked any tie to conservation/natural-resources purpose; presumption rebutted; summary judgment ordered for owners. |
| 3) Procedural compliance with Chapter 163 (notice, good-faith offer, property description) | Park District asserted it complied with R.C. 163.04/163.041/163.05 and provided required notices and offers before filing. | Less argued notices omitted required statements and the complaint/process failed statutory mandates. | Not addressed on merits — held moot after disposition on statutory-authority issue; trial court remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for owners. |
| 4) Jurisdiction / appealability of summary-denial orders | Park District contended the interlocutory denials were not immediately appealable; this Court previously denied motions to dismiss and found appealable under R.C. 163.09(B)(3). | Dissent argued the denials were nonfinal, no R.C. 163.09(B)(1) hearing had occurred, and thus the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. | Majority proceeded and decided merits; dissent would have dismissed for lack of final appealable order. |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Coles v. Granville, 877 N.E.2d 968 (Ohio 2007) (discussed board authority to appropriate and mandamus to compel appropriation proceedings)
- MacNAB v. Bd. of Park Com’rs of Metropolitan Park Dist. in Cleveland, 141 N.E. 332 (Ohio 1923) (broad reading of conservation power and public welfare justification for parks/parkways)
- Snyder v. Bd. of Park Com’rs of Cleveland Metropolitan Park Dist., 181 N.E. 483 (Ohio 1932) (property that contributes to public health/welfare may be considered within conservation of natural resources)
- Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006) (legislative delegations of eminent-domain power must be strictly construed; doubts resolved for property owner)
- Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Bd. of Com’rs of Cleveland Metropolitan Park Dist., 135 N.E. 635 (Ohio 1922) (principle that grants of eminent-domain authority are strictly pursued and construed)