1:24-cv-06543
N.D. Ill.Aug 31, 2025Background
- MIK Transportation owns the registered trademark and operates the "Limo-Jet," a customized automobile made from a jet fuselage shown at events for hire.
- In April 2023, Mohammed Ramadan and associates visited Jidd Motors in Des Plaines, Illinois to photograph/video the Limo-Jet after representing a need to evaluate use in shows/music videos; they allegedly agreed not to damage the vehicle or publish images without MIK's consent.
- MIK alleges Ramadan (an artist promoted by Salxco UAM LLC) was accompanied by transportation and bodyguards paid for by UAM, and that Ramadan acted as UAM’s agent in securing footage.
- MIK later discovered footage and photos of the Limo-Jet in a February 2024 music video (“Arabi”) featuring Ramadan, Sari Abboud, and Nayvadius Cash (Future), which had millions of views.
- MIK sued for breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and misappropriation against UAM and Abboud; UAM and Abboud moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, copyright preemption, and failure to state claims.
- The court denied both motions: it found plaintiff’s agency and jurisdiction allegations plausible, rejected Copyright Act preemption at the pleading stage, and allowed negligence, fraud, and related claims to proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal jurisdiction over UAM | Ramadan acted as UAM's agent; his Illinois visit and conduct are attributable to UAM | Ramadan is not UAM's agent or employee; no UAM contacts with Illinois | Denied dismissal: plaintiff's allegations (and docs showing UAM paid for transport/security) suffice at pleading stage to attribute agent contacts for specific jurisdiction (plausible agency) |
| Copyright preemption of state-law claims | Claims are about unauthorized use of images of an uncopyrightable object (vehicle) and are not equivalent to federal copyright rights | State-law claims are equivalent to exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106 and thus preempted | Denied dismissal: at motion-to-dismiss stage, preemption not satisfied where defendant used images of a noncopyrightable object for personal gain |
| Agency (whether Ramadan acted for UAM/Abboud) | UAM paid for Ramadan’s transportation and security and supervised his activities; Ramadan acted to secure footage for UAM | UAM submitted affidavit denying Ramadan was its agent or employee | Denied dismissal: allegations and supporting documentation plausibly plead agency; merits reserved for later stage |
| Claim-specific defenses (fraud pleading; economic-loss rule; ownership/authorization) | Fraud alleged via false promises to evaluate/use then publish without consent; damages include property damage and lost income | Defendants contend fraud is nonactionable promises about future conduct; negligence improper under Moorman economic-loss doctrine; contradictions about who paid/right to publish | Denied dismissal: fraud pleaded with Rule 9(b) particularity (false promise actionable); negligence seeks property damage plus lost income (not barred by Moorman); allegations about payment and publication rights do not defeat claims at pleading stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Bilek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 8 F.4th 581 (7th Cir. 2021) (agent contacts can be attributed to defendant for specific personal jurisdiction)
- Turnock v. Cope, 816 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1987) (on resolving factual conflicts in jurisdictional discovery and motions)
- Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986) (two-part test for Copyright Act preemption of state-law claims)
- Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 91 Ill.2d 69 (Ill. 1982) (economic-loss doctrine distinguishing recoverable property damage from barred purely economic loss)
- Steinberg v. Chicago Med. Sch., 69 Ill.2d 320 (Ill. 1977) (false promises can be actionable as fraud when used to accomplish the fraud)