Miguel Mendias-Mendoza v. Jefferson Sessions, III
877 F.3d 223
5th Cir.2017Background
- Mendias-Mendoza, a Mexican national, was charged as deportable after entering the U.S. without inspection in 1991; he signed a written stipulation admitting deportability and waived appeal, and an IJ ordered deportation.
- In November 2014 (23 years later) he filed a motion to reopen, claiming in an affidavit he had used a false name in 1991 and in fact was an LPR since 1989, had reentered using an LPR card, and later renewed LPR status; his wife allegedly obtained LPR status based on him.
- The IJ found the motion untimeliness question inapplicable under pre-1992 law but held Mendias-Mendoza offered only an affidavit and no evidence showing his LPR status was unavailable in 1991, failed to show prima facie eligibility for adjustment, and had not filed required applications; the IJ declined to reopen sua sponte.
- The BIA affirmed, concluding he submitted no previously unavailable, material evidence and failed to establish prima facie eligibility or submit required applications; the BIA also declined to reopen sua sponte.
- Mendias-Mendoza challenged the 1991 order and asserted due-process violations; the Fifth Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction to review the original 1991 deportation order and also lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary decision not to exercise sua sponte authority.
- The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard to denial of the motion to reopen and affirmed because the movant did not present material, previously unavailable evidence or establish prima facie eligibility for relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the BIA erred in denying the motion to reopen for lack of previously unavailable material evidence | Mendias-Mendoza: affidavit plus later renewals of LPR status show he was LPR in 1989 and evidence was effectively unavailable in 1991 | Government: only an affidavit; no explanation why alleged LPR status was unavailable in 1991 and renewals are immaterial to status at 1991 hearing | Held: No abuse of discretion — movant failed to present material, previously unavailable evidence |
| Whether Mendias-Mendoza established a prima facie case for adjustment of status | Mendias-Mendoza: asserted eligibility based on claimed LPR status and derivative benefits to family | Government: no supporting documentation, no application submitted, and no prima facie showing | Held: No — failed to establish prima facie eligibility |
| Whether the IJ/BIA abused discretion in declining to reopen sua sponte | Mendias-Mendoza: asked the agencies to exercise sua sponte authority to reopen | Government: discretionary refusal is unreviewable; no abuse shown | Held: Court lacked jurisdiction to review discretionary refusal; decision stands |
| Whether denial violated due process | Mendias-Mendoza: denial deprived him of liberty interest and due process | Government: motion to reopen is discretionary; no protected liberty interest; denial is not a constitutional deprivation | Held: No due-process violation; no protected liberty interest in discretionary reopening |
Key Cases Cited
- INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (U.S. 1988) (standards for reopening — previously unavailable, material evidence requirement)
- Altamirano-Lopez v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2006) (motions to reopen are disfavored; heavy burden on movant)
- Barrios-Cantarero v. Holder, 772 F.3d 1019 (5th Cir. 2014) (abuse-of-discretion standard for denial of motions to reopen)
- Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1995) (30-day limit for petitions to review deportation orders is mandatory and jurisdictional)
- Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2004) (no due-process violation where relief is purely discretionary)