Miguel Alvarado v. State of Indiana
89 N.E.3d 442
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Miguel Alvarado lived with and later married the victim’s mother and, between 2011–2013, repeatedly molested the victim (born 2005), including oral, vaginal, and anal penetration; the victim reported the abuse in early 2015.
- Around the same time the victim made allegations against Alvarado, she also alleged similar sexual abuse by her mother’s then‑boyfriend; police sought a warrant against that boyfriend.
- In 2015 the State charged Alvarado with nine counts of Class A felony child molesting; at trial the court excluded evidence and related documents alleging the subsequent molestation by the mother’s boyfriend.
- After the State’s closing argument, Alvarado moved to reopen his case, asserting the prosecutor had opened the door to the excluded evidence; the trial court denied the motion.
- A jury convicted Alvarado on four counts; the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 90 years.
- Alvarado appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by (1) excluding evidence that the victim was molested by another person and (2) refusing to allow reopening of evidence after closing argument.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of evidence that victim was molested by another person after abuse by defendant | Exclusion was proper under Evid. R. 412 and trial court discretion; the State argued the victim was not sexually innocent and defense failed to show necessity of the evidence | Alvarado argued the excluded evidence was admissible to show an alternate source of the victim’s sexual knowledge and to challenge credibility (sexual innocence inference; Confrontation Clause) | Court affirmed exclusion: trial court did not abuse discretion because the record rebutted a presumption of the victim’s sexual ignorance (she received "good touch/bad touch" instruction) and defendant failed to establish necessity under the sexual‑innocence theory |
| Confrontation/right to cross‑examine challenged by exclusion | State: right to effective cross‑examination is not absolute and may yield to other trial interests | Alvarado: exclusion violated his constitutional right to confront and adequately cross‑examine the victim | Held: No constitutional violation—Confrontation Clause does not guarantee any particular form of cross‑examination; exclusion reasonable given other evidence of the victim’s sexual knowledge |
| Reopening evidence after State’s closing (prosecutor allegedly opened door) | State: prosecutor’s closing argued plausibility of victim’s testimony, not exclusivity as to source of knowledge; reopening would prejudice State and was untimely | Alvarado: prosecutor’s remarks created impression that defendant was the sole source of the victim’s sexual knowledge, so door was opened to the excluded evidence | Held: Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying reopening—prosecutor’s statements were permissible argument about plausibility and the defendant failed to show prejudice or unreasonable limitation |
| Standard of review for evidentiary rulings and reopening | State: appellate review is deferential; trial court has broad discretion | Alvarado: evidentiary rulings and refusal to reopen were unreasonable and affected substantial rights | Held: Appellate court applied abuse‑of‑discretion standard and found no abuse; rulings sustainable on record |
Key Cases Cited
- Curley v. State, 777 N.E.2d 58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (standard: admissibility of evidence lies within trial court’s discretion)
- Oatts v. State, 899 N.E.2d 714 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (discusses sexual‑innocence inference and sets a “compromise approach” requiring defendant to show prior act occurred and is sufficiently similar)
- Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (Confrontation Clause guarantees opportunity for effective cross‑examination, not unlimited questioning)
- Tague v. Richards, 3 F.3d 1133 (7th Cir. 1993) (Confrontation Clause limits and accommodation to other trial interests)
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (Confrontation rights may bow to other legitimate trial interests)
- Flynn v. State, 497 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. 1986) (factors and deferential standard for reopening evidence after close of proof)
- Allman v. State, 235 N.E.2d 56 (Ind. 1968) (reversal for refusal to reopen requires showing prejudice to substantial rights)