Miguel Adorno v. Michael Melvin
876 F.3d 917
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Miguel Adorno was convicted by a jury of first-degree attempted murder while armed after firing shots at a house party; he was sentenced to 30 years.
- At voir dire the trial judge described the presumption of innocence and compared civil preponderance to criminal reasonable doubt using a "scale" analogy and an implied hand gesture; Illinois does not define reasonable doubt.
- At the close of evidence the judge gave formal jury instructions, including the unchallenged reasonable-doubt instruction.
- On direct appeal Adorno argued the judge’s voir dire remarks invited conviction on less than reasonable doubt (relying chiefly on federal law and citing Victor v. Nebraska); the Illinois Appellate Court analyzed only state-law error and denied relief.
- Adorno filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court reviewed de novo, found a due-process violation, and granted habeas relief.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding no reasonable likelihood the jury understood the remarks to permit conviction on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt and resolving questions about Richter deference as unnecessary to the outcome.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the judge’s voir dire remarks invited conviction on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt | Adorno: the judge’s scale analogy and comments could lead jurors to apply a lesser standard, violating due process | State: remarks distinguished civil preponderance from criminal reasonable doubt and did not lessen the constitutional burden; formal instructions reinforced reasonable doubt | Held: No reasonable likelihood jurors were invited to convict on less than reasonable doubt; no due-process violation |
| Whether the Illinois Appellate Court’s failure to cite federal law forecloses AEDPA deference (Richter presumption) | Adorno: state court didn’t address his federal claim so federal court should review de novo | State: Richter presumption applies when state court rules against a claim without explicit federal discussion, triggering §2254(d) deference | Held: Court assumed Richter need not be resolved because claim fails even under de novo review |
| Proper role of trial judges defining reasonable doubt | Adorno: judge’s attempt to explain reasonable doubt improperly risked lowering the burden | State: Constitution does not forbid defining reasonable doubt and the judge’s comments distinguished standards without lowering burden | Held: Federal Constitution permits definitions but error exists only if there is a reasonable likelihood jurors misunderstood; none here |
| Whether voir dire remarks must be assessed in isolation or in context of entire charge | Adorno: voir dire remarks were prejudicial on their own | State: remarks must be read in context, including formal instructions | Held: Remarks viewed in context (including final instructions) do not create a reasonable likelihood of constitutional error |
Key Cases Cited
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (presumption that unexplained state-court denial adjudicated federal claim on the merits)
- Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (prohibition on federal constitutional error unless reasonable likelihood jury applied less than reasonable-doubt standard)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (state must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (jury instructions must be read in context of the entire charge)
- Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289 (Richter presumption applies when state opinion addresses some issues but not the federal claim)
- Thompkins v. Pfister, 698 F.3d 976 (Seventh Circuit standard of review for §2254 rulings)