MidFirst Bank v. McNeal
52 N.E.3d 378
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- Inez McNeal obtained a mortgage in 2003; she died in 2009 and the loan later defaulted.
- MidFirst Bank filed foreclosure in 2012; amended complaints named a special representative and later named Devita McNeal as independent executor of Inez's estate.
- As executor, Devita appeared, was served, answered, but did not oppose the bank's summary-judgment/foreclosure motion; court entered judgment of foreclosure and later confirmed sale.
- After the sale confirmation, Devita (individually, not as executor) filed a motion asserting she was a known heir and that the foreclosure decree was void because she was not personally named or served as a defendant.
- The trial court denied that post-sale motion; Devita appealed individually alleging the foreclosure was void for failure to name her.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (MidFirst) | Defendant's Argument (McNeal) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a nonparty (McNeal individually) may properly file postjudgment motions in foreclosure without intervening | McNeal was not a party and thus had no procedural right to file such motions; she needed to intervene under statutory procedure | McNeal contends she was a known heir with an ownership interest that vested at death and thus the foreclosure was void for failing to name her | Court held McNeal, individually, was a nonparty who never sought timely intervention; her motion was a nullity and not properly considered |
| Whether this court has jurisdiction over McNeal's appeal | Order denying a nonparty's improper motion is not a final, appealable order; appeal must be by a party or from a final judgment | McNeal argued she has a direct interest as heir and resident and cited constitutional and rule-based jurisdiction | Court held it lacked jurisdiction: the order was nonfinal and McNeal did not show an alternative basis for appeal |
| Whether Rule 304(a) or 304(b) or other rules supply appellate jurisdiction | MidFirst argues no applicable Rule 304 certification and no applicable 304(b) subsection | McNeal invoked Rule 304 and constitutional final-judgment principles | Court held neither Rule 304(a) nor 304(b) applied; no 304(a) certification and no applicable 304(b) ground was shown |
| Whether a postjudgment motion filed by a nonparty tolled the 30-day appeal deadline | MidFirst argued section 2-1203 applies only to parties, so McNeal's motion did not toll the appeal deadline | McNeal relied on her section 2-1203 filing to justify a timely appeal from denial of that motion | Court held section 2-1203 relief is limited to parties; McNeal's motion was ineffective to toll the appeal period and her notice of appeal from the confirmed-sale order was untimely |
Key Cases Cited
- Brentine v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 356 Ill. App. 3d 760 (discussing appellate jurisdiction and duty to consider jurisdiction)
- Success Nat. Bank v. Specialist Eye Care Ctr., 304 Ill. App. 3d 74 (nonparty lacks standing to appeal in ordinary circumstances)
- In re Special Prosecutor, 164 Ill. App. 3d 183 (intervention must be formal; courts cannot recognize intervention by implication)
- Stone v. Baldwin, 414 Ill. 257 (appeal by a person not a party is unauthorized)
- EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Kemp, 2012 IL 113419 (order confirming sale is the final, appealable order in a foreclosure)