252 A.3d 745
R.I.2021Background
- Eleven-lot subdivision straddling Portsmouth and Middletown; seven lots have homes in Portsmouth, four in Middletown. Three contested sub-lots (1, 2, 4) have homes in Middletown but include taxable land in Portsmouth within the Portsmouth Water & Fire District (PWFD).
- PWFD sought to require a water-main extension to improve its system; initially approved then later refused to allow the four Middletown homes to connect to PWFD mains, despite prior agreement from the City of Newport and a 1985 stipulation (Brennan).
- Middle Creek Farm filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking a declaration that PWFD must provide water to the disputed sub-lots; PWFD resisted, moved to dismiss for failure to join owners of other straddling parcels, and argued its charter and G.L. § 46-15-2 limited service.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment in part: held the charter term "inhabitants" is read broadly to include owners of taxable real estate who pay taxes to PWFD, and declared sub-lots 1, 2, and 4 entitled to connect to PWFD mains; dismissed PWFD's motion to join other property owners as speculative.
- PWFD appealed, arguing the court misinterpreted "inhabitants," failed to defer to PWFD's interpretation, should have required exhaustion of administrative remedies under § 46-15-2, and should have joined indispensable parties.
- The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of PWFD's duty to supply water (meaning of "inhabitants" in charter) | "Inhabitants" should be read broadly to include owners of real estate taxed by PWFD; taxation triggers right to service. | "Inhabitants" means permanent residents/households within district; service limited to properties with buildings located in district. | Court held "inhabitants" reasonably construed to include owners of taxable real estate who pay PWFD taxes; sub-lots 1,2,4 entitled to connect. |
| Deference to PWFD's charter interpretation | N/A (plaintiff urged ordinary statutory construction). | PWFD urged deference to its administrative interpretation of the charter. | Court declined blind deference; agency interpretations receive weight but court adopts interpretation most persuasive in context. |
| Applicability of G.L. § 46-15-2 (restrictions on extending mains outside district/exhaustion) | Plaintiffs: § 46-15-2 does not bar service where property is taxable within district (or where district already served). | PWFD: statute forbids extending mains into municipalities not previously legally served without approvals. | Court held § 46-15-2 did not preclude service to sub-lots that contain taxable property within the district; plaintiffs prevail on charter basis. |
| Failure to join owners of other straddling parcels as indispensable parties | Interests of other owners are speculative and not directly affected; joinder not required. | Owners of 53 straddling properties have interests that could be affected and thus are indispensable. | Court agreed with trial justice: PWFD failed to show those owners have an actual, adverse, inextricable interest; joinder not required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594 (R.I. 2019) (de novo standard for reviewing summary judgment)
- Felkner v. Chariho Regional School Committee, 968 A.2d 865 (R.I. 2009) (rules for construing municipal charters like statutes)
- Chang v. University of Rhode Island, 375 A.2d 925 (R.I. 1977) (courts should give effect to all words and avoid literal tunnel vision in statutory interpretation)
- Grasso v. Raimondo, 177 A.3d 482 (R.I. 2018) (agency interpretations entitled to weight but not binding if unpersuasive)
- Rosano v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 91 A.3d 336 (R.I. 2014) (joinder and indispensability rules in declaratory-judgment actions)
- Root v. Providence Water Supply Board, 850 A.2d 94 (R.I. 2004) (definition of "indispensable party")
- Town of Warren v. Bristol Warren Regional School District, 159 A.3d 1029 (R.I. 2017) (actual, present, adverse interest required to compel joinder)