Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197

Background

Microsoft (U.S. company) ran a web‑based email service (Outlook/Hotmail) that stores user data in global datacenters, including one in Dublin, Ireland; some account metadata remained in the U.S.
A U.S. magistrate judge issued an SCA "warrant" under 18 U.S.C. § 2703 directing Microsoft (served in Washington state) to produce the contents of a named account; probable cause was found for narcotics trafficking.
Microsoft produced U.S.-located non‑content data but refused to retrieve and import email content stored on servers in Ireland; it moved to quash as to foreign‑stored content.
The magistrate judge and then the district court denied the motion to quash and held Microsoft in civil contempt for noncompliance; Microsoft appealed.
The Second Circuit evaluated whether the SCA’s warrant provision authorizes extraterritorial enforcement against a U.S.-based service provider to seize customer content stored abroad.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't)	Defendant's Argument (Microsoft)	Held
Whether an SCA warrant may compel production of customer content stored on servers located outside the U.S.	SCA warrants function like subpoenas: served on a provider in the U.S., they require production of records in the provider’s possession or control regardless of storage location.	SCA warrants are traditional warrants with territorial limits; Congress did not authorize extraterritorial application to compel retrieval/import of content stored abroad.	The SCA does not authorize extraterritorial enforcement; the warrant cannot compel Microsoft to produce content stored in Ireland.
Whether an SCA warrant should be treated as a subpoena for extraterritorial‑reach analysis	The statute’s lack of territorial restriction and practical precedent justify treating SCA warrants like subpoenas.	The statute uses the term "warrant" (term of art) and incorporates Rule 41 procedures; Congress intended heightened, territorial warrant protections.	The Court rejected equating SCA warrants to subpoenas; the word "warrant" and statutory context indicate domestic, warrant‑type protections.
Whether the district court could find Microsoft in civil contempt for refusing to comply with the warrant’s extraterritorial aspects	Contempt was proper because Microsoft failed to obey a validly issued and served court order.	Microsoft complied with domestic aspects and refused only the extraterritorial component, which was unlawful to enforce.	The contempt finding was vacated because enforcement of the warrant as to foreign‑stored content was unlawful.
What is the statutory “focus” for Morrison extraterritoriality analysis?	Focus is on compelled disclosure (the government’s ability to obtain records), making domestic contacts sufficient.	Focus is on protecting users’ privacy in stored communications; seizure occurs where data is accessed (the server location).	The Court held the SCA’s focus is the privacy of stored communications and that the invasion would occur where the content is seized (Ireland), so application would be extraterritorial.

Key Cases Cited

Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (limiting extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes; two‑step focus test)
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 579 U.S. _ (reaffirming presumption against extraterritoriality)
Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.) (subpoena can reach documents located abroad when recipient is subject to jurisdiction)
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (bank records are business records of bank, not private papers of depositor)
Verdugo‑Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (Fourth Amendment’s territorial focus)
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E‑Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y.) (magistrate opinion denying Microsoft’s motion to quash; treated SCA warrant like subpoena)