Microsoft Corp. v. Baker
137 S. Ct. 1702
| SCOTUS | 2017Background
- plaintiffs alleged Xbox 360 design defect and sought class treatment; district court struck class allegations; Ninth Circuit denied Rule 23(f) permission; respondents dismissed claims with prejudice but reserved right to revive if certification reversed; respondents appealed only the denial/strike of class allegations; Microsoft argued dismissal prevented appellate review under Rule 23(f) and §1291
- the dismissal-with-prejudice tactic was designed to create an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order; respondents sought to review the class-striking order despite not pursuing individual claims to final judgment
- Rule 23(f) authorizes discretionary interlocutory review of class-certification decisions; respondents chose to dismiss claims to trigger review; district court proceedings could be disrupted by piecemeal appeals
- the Court held that voluntary dismissal with prejudice does not constitute a final decision under §1291 and cannot create mandatory appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order
- Rulemaking framework (Rules Enabling Act) directs review mechanism for prejudgment orders through Rule 23(f) rather than by converting interlocutory orders into final judgments
- Conclusion: Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction to review the order under §1291 is lacking; remand for further proceedings consistent with the opinion
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether voluntary dismissal with prejudice yields a final decision under §1291 | respondents used dismissal to obtain immediate appeal | Microsoft argues no final decision; dismissal cannot finalize the case | No final decision under §1291 |
| Whether Rule 23(f) skews finality by allowing discretionary review | Rule 23(f) should permit appeal from denial of class certification | Rule 23(f) balances finality and review; dismissal tactic undermines this balance | Rule 23(f) control; dismissal tactic not permitted to create automatic appeal |
| Whether the policy concerns of finality and interference with district proceedings justify denying jurisdiction | finality guarantees prevent piecemeal appeals | allows efficiency via Rule 23(f) | Finality concerns upheld; no jurisdiction under §1291 |
| Whether the dismissal tactic could be used to force immediate appellate review against defendants | plaintiff-driven appeals imperative to ensure efficiency | not applicable; tactic creates imbalance | One-sided tactic undermines §1291 and Rule 23(f) |
Key Cases Cited
- Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978) (death-knell doctrine not warranting mandatory appellate jurisdiction)
- Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100 (2009) (finality and rulemaking; limits on immediate appeals)
- Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863 (1994) (final-judgment concept and finality interpretations)
- Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 (1940) (finality not a technical termination; serves healthy legal system)
- Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35 (1995) (rulemaking as preferred means for determining finality and review)
- Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999) (illustrative of Rule 23(f) discretionary review)
