293 So.3d 722
La. Ct. App.2020Background
- Plaintiffs sued Melissa Sugar-Gold for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress seeking injunctive relief and damages.
- Defendant filed peremptory exceptions (no cause of action and prescription) and a special motion to strike under La. C.C.P. art. 971.
- The trial court granted the special motion to strike but denied defendant attorney fees; this court in Quinlan I affirmed the strike, reversed the denial of fees, and remanded.
- On remand the trial court held a hearing, awarded defendant $48,588.33 in fees/costs (excluding fees for the exceptions, her motion for new trial, and appellate work), and both parties appealed.
- This court affirmed the award for the motion to strike, reversed the denial of fees for the motion for new trial and for prior appellate work, awarded $1,500 for appellate work, and remanded for determination of reasonable fees for the motion for new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recoverability of fees for exceptions (no cause of action & prescription) | Fees should be limited to work on the special motion to strike; awarding fees for unrelated work would encourage abuse. | Exceptions are pleadings relevant to the “probability of success” on the art. 971 motion and thus fees are recoverable. | Denied — exceptions were independent, repetitive back-ups not required for the strike; no fees awarded. |
| Recoverability of fees for motion for new trial | Motion merely sought fees and was not the special motion to strike itself, so fees for it should be denied. | Motion enforced defendant’s entitlement under art. 971; fees for litigating collection of entitled fees are recoverable. | Granted in part — remanded to trial court to fix reasonable fees and costs for the motion for new trial. |
| Recoverability of appellate attorney fees for defense on prior appeal (Quinlan I) | If appellate fees were intended, Quinlan I would have expressly awarded them; fee statutes are penal and narrowly construed. | Art. 971’s mandatory fee language and broad remedial purpose support shifting reasonable appellate fees. | Granted in part — appellate court awarded $1,500 for defendant’s appellate work and found that amount reasonable to cover both the prior and the instant appeal. |
| Reasonableness/amount of fees for the special motion to strike | Award is excessive and commingles time spent on exceptions with motion to strike work. | Invoices, hourly rate ($350) and attorney credentials show requested fees reasonable; plaintiffs offered no contrary evidence. | Affirmed — trial court’s discretionary, reasoned reduction was not an abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Langley v. Petro Star Corp. of La., 792 So.2d 721 (La. 2001) (statutory attorney-fee provisions are penal and must be strictly construed)
- Sharbono v. Steve Lang & Son Loggers, 696 So.2d 1382 (La. 1997) (attorney-fee awards function as a penalty to discourage conduct)
- Delta Chem. Corp. v. Lynch, 979 So.2d 579 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2008) (fees recoverable under art. 971 are limited to those associated with the motion to strike)
- Gwandiku v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 972 So.2d 334 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2007) (where no opposition evidence exists, strict statutory "shall" language may justify awarding requested fees)
- Rivet v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 680 So.2d 1154 (La. 1996) (factors for assessing reasonableness of attorney fees)
- In re Succession of Carroll, 72 So.3d 384 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2011) (affirming award of attorney fees under art. 971(B))