Michelle Miller, Town of Sellersburg Clerk-Treasurer v. Town Board of Sellersburg, Indiana
10A01-1612-MI-2908
| Ind. Ct. App. | Nov 29, 2017Background
- In Oct. 2015 the Town Board approved Ordinance 2015-008, which included budgeted funding for two deputy clerks in the Clerk-Treasurer’s office.
- In Dec. 2015 the Town Council (town legislative body) approved Ordinance 2015-012, which removed funding for one of those deputy clerk positions.
- In Jan. 2016 Clerk-Treasurer Michelle Miller filed a petition for mandate seeking reinstatement of the budgeted two deputy positions and later moved for summary judgment.
- Miller relied on Indiana Code § 36-5-6-7, arguing the statute vests appointment authority in the clerk-treasurer and the town board’s role is only participatory, not veto power.
- The Town Board responded that § 36-5-6-7 conditions the clerk-treasurer’s appointments on approval by the town legislative body; it moved for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town Board; the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the statute’s plain language requires legislative approval and the Board’s ordinance disapproved Miller’s appointment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the town legislative body may prevent the clerk‑treasurer’s appointment/number of deputies under § 36-5-6-7 | Miller: statute vests appointment power in clerk‑treasurer; “with the approval” is merely participatory, not veto authority | Town Board: statute conditions appointments on approval by the town legislative body, allowing it to reject or alter appointments/budgeted positions | The statute plainly requires approval by the town legislative body; Board’s elimination of funding shows nonapproval, so Board entitled to judgment as a matter of law |
Key Cases Cited
- Ind. Restorative Dentistry, P.C. v. Laven Ins. Agency, Inc., 27 N.E.3d 260 (Ind. 2015) (summary judgment standard and burdens on moving party)
- Carson v. Palombo, 18 N.E.3d 1036 (Ind. 2014) (construe factual inferences for nonmoving party on summary judgment)
- Pike Tp. Educ. Found., Inc. v. Rubenstein, 831 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (statutory interpretation is a pure question of law appropriate for summary disposition)
- Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating & Air Conditioning Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. 2001) (first step in statutory interpretation is determining whether the Legislature spoke clearly)
- Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 839 N.E.2d 154 (Ind. 2005) (clear and unambiguous statutes require words to be given their plain and ordinary meaning)