173 A.3d 868
R.I.2017Background
- In March 2015 Michelle Hall sued Tavares Pediatric Center on behalf of her daughter for injuries allegedly sustained while in Tavares’s care; claims included negligence and loss of consortium.
- Hall settled with Tavares and executed a Joint Tortfeasor Release that expressly exempted "agents, employees, representatives, and/or medical staff of Tavares," and reserved the right to sue individual staff including nurse Colleen Belmonte.
- Hall subsequently sued nurses Colleen Belmonte and Kim Hornby for the same injuries.
- Belmonte and Hornby moved for summary judgment, arguing G.L. 1956 § 10-6-2 treats a master and servant as a single tortfeasor so the release of Tavares also released them.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the nurses; Hall appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 10-6-2 bar Hall's claims against the nurses after she released Tavares? | Hall: § 10-6-2 should not bar claims because release of a vicariously liable master does not extinguish a servant’s independent liability. | Nurses: § 10-6-2 deems master and servant a single tortfeasor, so release of master releases servant. | Held: § 10-6-2 plainly treats master and servant as a single tortfeasor; release of Tavares released the nurses. |
| Did attorney affidavit create a genuine factual dispute to defeat summary judgment? | Hall: Attorney affidavit shows initial complaint alleged independent liability by Tavares, raising an issue of fact. | Nurses: Statute controls and forecloses claims regardless of affidavit. | Held: Court did not need to resolve affidavit issue because statute dispositive; summary judgment affirmed. |
| Can release language in a private release preserve claims against servants contrary to statute? | Hall: The explicit reservation in the Joint Tortfeasor Release preserved claims against Tavares staff. | Nurses: Statutory mandate overrides contrary contractual release language. | Held: Statute controls; release’s reservation language cannot override § 10-6-2. |
| Should distinctions between vicarious and independent liability alter § 10-6-2’s application? | Hall: Distinction matters — independent (actual) liability of servant should survive master’s release. | Nurses: § 10-6-2 makes no such distinction; it treats master and servant as a single tortfeasor regardless of liability theory. | Held: Court applies statute literally; no distinction affects result under § 10-6-2. |
Key Cases Cited
- DelSanto v. Hyundai Motor Finance Co., 882 A.2d 561 (R.I. 2005) (interpreting § 10-6-2’s single-tortfeasor rule)
- Pridemore v. Napolitano, 689 A.2d 1053 (R.I. 1997) (discussing vicarious liability and effect of releasing a servant on master)
- Van Hoesen v. Lloyd’s of London, 134 A.3d 178 (R.I. 2016) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild, Local 951, AFT v. Woonsocket School Committee, 770 A.2d 834 (R.I. 2001) (contract provisions cannot override applicable state law)