Michelle Gilbank v. Wood County Department of Human Services
111 F.4th 754
7th Cir.2024Background
- In summer 2018 Michelle Gilbank lost temporary custody of her 4‑year‑old daughter, T.E.H., after police and county social workers responded to alleged drug‑related concerns; the state juvenile court ordered the child placed with the father. Gilbank later regained sole custody in a separate family‑court proceeding in March 2020.
- Events central to the dispute: (1) a June/July 2018 welfare check and a July 3 urine test that was positive for methamphetamine; (2) an August 21, 2018 traffic stop and arrest of Gilbank that led to the child’s removal; (3) an August 23 temporary custody hearing held without Gilbank present and a later CHIPS adjudication and supervision order; and (4) a closure of CHIPS proceedings in September 2019.
- Gilbank sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related statutes against police, social workers, and others, alleging a mix of Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, procedural and substantive due‑process claims (including interference with family integrity), conspiracy and Monell claims, and violations of state protective‑custody statutes.
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, concluding many claims were barred by the Rooker‑Feldman doctrine and that the remaining claims failed on the merits (consent to urinalysis, no Fifth Amendment use of statements, and preclusion or lack of constitutional violation for other claims).
- The Seventh Circuit heard the appeal en banc and issued a fragmented opinion: the judgment was affirmed, but the court split over Rooker‑Feldman’s scope. A majority rejected any “fraud exception” and found plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise federal claims in state court; a different majority held that claims for damages arising from state‑court judgments are not categorically barred by Rooker‑Feldman when they do not seek to undo the state judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rooker‑Feldman bars federal jurisdiction over claims based on alleged injuries caused by state‑court custody orders | Gilbank: some injuries predated the state judgments and others are independent; in any event she lacked a reasonable opportunity in state court | Defendants: Gilbank is a state‑court loser complaining of injuries caused by state judgments, inviting district court review and thus barred by Rooker‑Feldman | Court (majority for Parts I–III, V, VI, VIII): Rooker‑Feldman applies to claims whose injury was caused by state judgments and that seek review/rejection of them; but claims based on injuries that occurred before the state judgments are not barred. The court also rejected a fraud exception and found Gilbank had a reasonable opportunity to litigate in state court. A different majority (Kirsch/Easterbrook et al.) held that damages claims that do not seek to undo the state judgment are not barred by Rooker‑Feldman. |
| Whether a “fraud exception” saves claims that allege opponents misled the state court into issuing the judgment | Gilbank: defendants made fraudulent statements to state court so Rooker‑Feldman should not bar her federal suit | Defendants: alleged fraud does not change Rooker‑Feldman’s jurisdictional bar where the injury was caused by a state judgment | Court: En banc majority rejects any generalized fraud exception; fraud allegations do not automatically defeat Rooker‑Feldman (fraud must have independently created an injury predating the state judgment). |
| Whether Gilbank had a reasonable opportunity to raise federal issues in state court (narrow exception to Rooker‑Feldman) | Gilbank: procedural time limits, hearings held without her, and scope of CHIPS proceedings prevented meaningful state‑court adjudication of constitutional claims | Defendants: state statutes and multiple hearings gave Gilbank adequate opportunity and she actually raised many issues in state court | Court (en banc majority): Gilbank had reasonable opportunity to litigate in state court (distinguishing Long and Brokaw where no such opportunity existed), so the narrow exception does not apply. |
| Merits of claims not barred by Rooker‑Feldman (urinalysis consent; interrogation after request for counsel; seizure/eviction; substantive due process pre‑custody order; Monell and conspiracy) | Gilbank: searches and interrogation unconstitutional; eviction and removal unreasonable; state actors caused family‑integrity violation; Monell and conspiracy liability | Defendants: consent to urinalysis; no Fifth Amendment violation because statements were not used in prosecution; no governmental seizure/eviction by officials; reasonable suspicion/authority for pre‑custody actions; Monell/conspiracy fail without underlying constitutional violation | Court (all judges): Affirmed summary judgment to defendants on these merits: Gilbank consented to the urinalysis; no Fifth Amendment violation because no statements were used in a criminal proceeding; no government seizure/eviction by officers at the scene; pre‑custody investigative actions met reasonable‑suspicion/consent standards; Monell and §1985 fail absent an underlying constitutional wrong. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (establishing that only the Supreme Court may review state court judgments)
- District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (confirming limits on federal district‑court review of state court adjudications)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (clarifying the limited scope of Rooker‑Feldman and articulating the four‑part test)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (holding §1983 damages claims that would imply invalidity of an unvacated conviction are barred until conviction is set aside)
- Kelley v. Med‑1 Sols., LLC, 548 F.3d 600 (7th Cir.) (explaining Rooker‑Feldman application where damages claims would require review of state judgments)
- Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669 (7th Cir.) (holding fraud allegations that infect a state judgment do not remove Rooker‑Feldman bar when relief would functionally vacate the judgment)
- Bauer v. Koester, 951 F.3d 863 (7th Cir.) (applying Rooker‑Feldman to bar damages claims that would effectively undo a state foreclosure judgment)
- Swartz v. Heartland Equine Rescue, 940 F.3d 387 (7th Cir.) (Rooker‑Feldman barred claims where the injury was caused by state court orders)
- Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 (7th Cir.) (distinguishing pre‑judgment independent injuries and reasonable‑opportunity exceptions)
- Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748 F.3d 769 (7th Cir.) (noting that Rooker‑Feldman does not bar a federal suit that seeks damages for a fraud that resulted in an adverse state judgment)