659 S.W.3d 680
Tex.2022Background:
- Loyd J. Parker Jr.'s will gave his wife Ruthie (Ruthie Young Parker) a life estate in his entire estate with broad powers to "buy, sell, mortgage, lease... and deal with, manage, and control the assets as if she owned them in fee simple," plus a special power to alter the distribution of remainders among his children.
- As of 1998 the Cottonwood Ranch had multiple undivided interests: Loyd III owned a one‑eighth fee simple interest and an additional one‑eighth remainder interest in Loyd Jr.'s estate (subject to Ruthie's life estate and powers).
- In 1998 Loyd III executed a deed conveying to his daughters "all of my right, title and interest in and to" the Cottonwood Ranch; he did not expressly mention any remainder or his interest under his father’s will.
- Ruthie was still alive in 1998 and retained the power to sell or reallocate estate assets and to alter remainders; she never exercised those powers with respect to the ranch and died in 2006.
- After Loyd III died in 2014, his widow Kathy sued his daughters (Elise and Allison) asserting the 1998 deed did not convey Loyd III’s remainder interest; the court of appeals reversed the trial court and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Parker) | Defendant's Argument (Jordan) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1998 deed conveyed Loyd III's remainder interest in the Cottonwood Ranch | The deed did not convey the remainder/expectancy; it conveyed only the present interest | The phrase "all of my right, title and interest" conveyed Loyd III's present and future (remainder) interests | Deed did not convey the remainder; expectancies require clear manifestation to be conveyed |
| Nature of Loyd III's interest under Loyd Jr.'s will (vested remainder vs. expectancy) | Ruthie's broad powers made any specific interest in the ranch at most an expectancy | Loyd III held a vested remainder (albeit defeasible) in the estate | Court treated Loyd III’s interest in the ranch as an expectancy with no certainty any particular asset would pass to him |
| Whether general conveyance language ("all my right, title and interest") transfers an expectancy | Clark v. Gauntt governs: general language does not transfer an expectancy absent clear intent | "All" means all — broad language should transfer all interests the grantor holds or anticipates | Court applied Clark: general language did not transfer the expectancy because deed lacked clear manifestation of intent |
| Whether Clark should be limited where a future interest is fully vested and indefeasible | Clark remains a rule protecting against inadvertent conveyance of expectancies | Clark should not apply to truly vested, indefeasible future interests | Court declined to decide Clark’s reach to fully vested, indefeasible future interests because Loyd III’s interest was only an expectancy |
Key Cases Cited
- Clark v. Gauntt, 161 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Comm'n Op. 1942) (an expectancy of inheritance is not conveyed by a deed unless the instrument clearly manifests intent to convey it)
- Terrell v. Graham, 576 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1979) (reciprocal deeds that expressly reference authority to create future estates can convey expectancies)
- Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff, 596 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. 2020) (general principle that a grant of "all" conveys present interests shown in chain of title)
- Cockrell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 299 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1956) (warranty deed passes all estate owned by grantor at time of conveyance unless reservations or exceptions are stated)