Michele Black v. County of Montgomery
835 F.3d 358
3rd Cir.2016Background
- A November 2012 fire occurred at a family home in Pennsylvania; Black (from California) was present helping remove possessions while electricians were upgrading wiring.
- Local fire investigators (Hand, McGarvey, Fallon, Pomponio) concluded the fire was arson, allegedly misrepresenting, failing to preserve, and not testing electrical components and other evidence (e.g., matches).
- Police detectives questioned Black at the scene, detained her for questioning, and she was later indicted; an arrest warrant issued and she was arraigned in Pennsylvania, released on $50,000 unsecured bail, and compelled to travel from California repeatedly for court dates.
- Black alleged defendants fabricated, suppressed, and destroyed evidence in the investigation and prosecution; she was acquitted at trial in April 2014 after brief jury deliberation.
- Black sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution, Fourteenth Amendment due process for fabricated evidence, Monell and conspiracy claims; the District Court dismissed federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
- Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding (1) Black sufficiently alleged a Fourth Amendment “seizure” for a malicious-prosecution claim and (2) an acquitted defendant may bring a stand‑alone Fourteenth Amendment fabricated-evidence claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Black was “seized” for a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim | Black: pretrial restraints (arraignment, fingerprinting, unsecured bail, obligation to appear, repeated cross-country travel) amounted to a continuing seizure | Defendants: no formal incarceration or travel restriction; mere obligation to attend court is insufficient | Court: Yes — under Albright/Ginsburg concurrence and precedents, those pretrial restraints constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure |
| Whether a stand‑alone Fourteenth Amendment fabricated-evidence claim is available when the plaintiff was acquitted | Black: fabrication of evidence corrupts the truth‑seeking function and injures the defendant even if acquitted; conviction not required | Defendants: Halsey left conviction as prerequisite; acquittal precludes due process claim | Court: No conviction requirement; an acquitted defendant may sue if there is a reasonable likelihood the fabricated evidence caused the charging (causation standard) |
| Standard to show fabricated evidence caused injury | Black: reasonable likelihood that, absent fabrication, she would not have been charged | Defendants: require proof of conviction or resulting loss of liberty | Held: Adopted Halsey’s "reasonable likelihood" causation approach adapted to charging (not limited to convictions); summary judgment threshold remains high (fabrication must be significant) |
| Effect on Monell and conspiracy claims | Black: municipal and conspiracy claims depend on underlying constitutional violations | Defendants: dismissal appropriate if underlying claims fail | Held: Because underlying Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment dismissals reversed, Monell and conspiracy dismissals must be vacated and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (U.S. 1994) (plurality and Ginsburg concurrence discussing "continuing seizure" and framing malicious prosecution under Fourth Amendment)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (definition of seizure as restraint by physical force or show of authority)
- Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2014) (recognized stand‑alone Fourteenth Amendment fabricated‑evidence claim when conviction resulted from fabricated evidence; left open acquittal question)
- Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998) (pretrial restrictions including bond, travel limits, reporting requirements can constitute a continuing seizure)
- DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599 (3d Cir. 2005) (contrast: mere summons and minimal restrictions do not amount to seizure)
- Cole v. Carson, 802 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2015) (permitted due process fabricated‑evidence claim for acquitted defendants)
- United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1976) (fabricated/suppressed evidence undermines truth‑seeking function and fair trial process)
- Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (U.S. 1989) (seizure requires intentional government action to restrain liberty)