Micheal Leslie Lake v. Michael Skelton
2017 WL 4296582
11th Cir.2017Background
- Michael Lake, detained in the Cobb County jail in 2011, requested a vegetarian diet for religious reasons; Major Michael Skelton (a deputy sheriff sued in his official capacity) denied the request.
- Lake sued under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and RLUIPA; district court denied summary judgment on sovereign-immunity grounds.
- A panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding Georgia sovereign (Eleventh Amendment) immunity extends to a deputy sheriff for decisions about inmate diet.
- Judge Martin filed a published dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc: he argued the panel misapplied the Manders four-factor, function-specific test and Georgia law (notably O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2), which treats sheriffs as county officers and assigns counties the duty and cost of inmates’ necessities.
- The dissent contends state control/funding/liability factors weigh against immunity for feeding/medical/clothing functions; the court declined en banc rehearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lake) | Defendant's Argument (Skelton) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Georgia county sheriff (or deputy) is an “arm of the state” entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for decisions about feeding inmates | Sheriff acts for county re: feeding; Georgia statutes and state caselaw impose duty/cost on county; county funds and county sovereign-immunity regime apply, so Eleventh immunity does not bar suit | Under Manders, certain sheriff functions are state functions; state prescribes minimum controls (health standards, meal frequency) and funds/structure implicate state control; thus immunity applies | Panel: reversed and held Georgia sovereign immunity extends to the deputy sheriff for the dietary denial; en banc rehearing denied. Dissent: would deny immunity for feeding-related claims. |
| How O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2 and related Georgia law allocate responsibility for inmates’ food, medical care, and clothing | § 42-5-2 places duty and cost on counties (county must fund necessities); sheriffs implement county functions and act as county agents when providing necessities | The sheriff is the governmental unit having physical custody (the operative actor) and the statute’s language supports imposing the responsibility on the sheriff as the custody-holder; Manders permits immunity for some sheriff functions | Panel: interpreted statute as imposing the operative duty on the sheriff (supporting immunity for official-capacity money damages); dissent: Georgia appellate decisions interpret § 42-5-2 to impose duty and cost on counties, cutting against Eleventh immunity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1890) (states immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment)
- Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (adopts function-specific four-factor test to determine whether a sheriff is an arm of the state)
- Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (U.S. 1977) (local governments not protected by Eleventh Amendment)
- Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (U.S. 1890) (distinguishing state vs. local liability)
- Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 405 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2005) (application of Manders factors; lack of state liability weighs against arm-of-state status)
- Ross v. Jefferson Cty. Dep’t of Health, 701 F.3d 655 (11th Cir. 2012) (federal question resolved by how state courts treat the entity)
- Pellitteri v. Prine, 776 F.3d 777 (11th Cir. 2015) (applies Manders framework in a later context)
- Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (U.S. 1994) (the State’s treasury exposure is the most salient Eleventh Amendment factor)