Michael William Tappin v. State
Background
- Undercover officers observed Tappin’s associate leave a house with a digital scale and complete a drug transaction; surveillance continued at the house.
- After the associate left, Tappin exited the house, entered a vehicle that made an illegal U-turn, and officers stopped the vehicle; officers testified Tappin reached toward his waistband.
- Officers removed Tappin, asked for consent to search, and located ten grams of heroin in his pocket.
- Tappin pled guilty after the district court denied his suppression motion (he reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling); the appellate court affirmed the denial of suppression on grounds Tappin didn’t challenge scope below.
- Tappin filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not calling him to testify at the suppression hearing and for failing to challenge consent and the scope of the stop; he also moved for appointed counsel.
- The district court denied appointment of counsel, issued a notice of intent to dismiss (finding the petition was subject to summary dismissal), dismissed the petition for lack of response, and denied reconsideration. Tappin appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Tappin's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying appointment of counsel under I.C. § 19‑4904 | District court misapplied standards and denied counsel without adequately considering if petition raised possibility of valid claim | Denial proper because counsel decisions are tactical and petition’s claims were meritless given prior findings of reasonable suspicion | Procedure used was not an abuse of discretion, but denial of counsel was error because petition alleged facts raising possibility of a valid claim; remand for appointment of counsel |
| Whether petitioner alleged facts raising a possibility of a valid ineffective-assistance claim (trial counsel’s failure to call Tappin to testify at suppression hearing) | Tappin would have testified he did not reach for his waistband, was removed and searched without consent, and scope/search exceeded authority; this testimony could have undercut consent and scope | Trial counsel’s choices were tactical; prior finding of reasonable suspicion independently justified search and scope; frisk justified by drug investigation dangers | Court held Tappin’s alleged testimony, if believed, could negate consent and show an unlawful search; petition raised possibility of a valid claim requiring counsel appointment |
| Whether reasonable suspicion of drug activity equates to reasonable suspicion for a Terry frisk (i.e., that suspect is armed and dangerous) | Tappin: reasonable suspicion of drug activity alone does not satisfy the armed-and-dangerous requirement for a frisk; officers exceeded a frisk by reaching inside his pocket | State: reasonable suspicion of drug activity and officer safety concerns justified frisk and search that located heroin | Court accepted that reasonable suspicion of drug activity is not automatically sufficient for a frisk and that factual dispute could affect legality of search; factual development needed |
| Whether a conditional denial of counsel (deny now, review later) is acceptable procedure | Tappin: court must address appointment request before ruling on substantive issues to allow supplementation and renewed request | State: points to Workman where similar procedure was upheld where claims were frivolous | Court found the procedure not an abuse here (citing Workman) but described the conditional-denial practice as problematic; courts should rule on counsel request before dismissing substantively |
Key Cases Cited
- Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518 (Idaho 2007) (upholding district court’s denial of counsel where allegations were frivolous after file review)
- Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997) (court must address appointment-of-counsel request before ruling on substantive dismissal)
- Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789 (Idaho 2006) (explaining need to allow petitioner opportunity to supplement record and renew counsel request)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test: deficiency and prejudice)
- Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758 (Idaho 1989) (attorney performance judged against objective standard of reasonableness)
- Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006) (prejudice standard for guilty-plea cases: reasonable probability petitioner would have insisted on trial)
- Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339 (Idaho 2009) (appellate court may affirm dismissal even if district court failed to rule on counsel motion, when petition fails to raise possible valid claim)